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Note 
THE FRIENDLY SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE  
AND BANS ON MALE CIRCUMCISION  
MICHAEL J. WEIL 
In 2011, San Francisco placed a measure to outlaw infant male 
circumcision on its November ballot.  Members of the Jewish and Muslim 
faiths practice infant male circumcision as a tenet of their religions.  If 
approved, this ballot measure would have raised serious questions about 
the scope of religious liberty protected under the Constitution.  This Note 
argues that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prohibits 
governments from, at minimum, outlawing religious practices—at least not 
without satisfying the elements of strict scrutiny.  This Note will undertake 
a critical analysis of the United States Supreme Court’s concept of 
neutrality as has been applied to religious practice and will advance an 
argument for the theory of “substantive neutrality.”  Given that the San 
Francisco Ballot Measure fails to satisfy the substantive neutrality 
principle, and further that a circumcision ban does not serve a compelling 
state interest, the proposal would not be upheld under the rule advocated 
for in this Note.  
Part II of this Note will provide a brief background of the religious 
motivations and social constructions of male circumcision and the medical 
debate over the procedure.  Part III discusses the text and legislative 
motives of the San Francisco Ballot Measure.  Subsequently, Part IV of 
this Note summarizes the Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence.  
Part V will analyze how a court considering the San Francisco Ballot 
Measure would apply these cases to the proposal, and it will show why 
analysis confined to the present rule is constitutionally deficient.  Finally, 
the Note argues that substantive neutrality is the correct formulation of the 
neutrality requirement, and that the San Francisco Ballot Measure violates 
the principle.
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THE FRIENDLY SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE  
AND BANS ON MALE CIRCUMCISION  
MICHAEL J. WEIL

 
God . . . said to Abraham, “As for you, you and your 
offspring to come throughout the ages shall keep [m]y 
covenant . . . . [E]very male among you shall be 
circumcised.  You shall circumcise the flesh of your 
foreskin and that shall be the sign of the covenant between 
Me and you.  And throughout the generations, every male 
among you shall be circumcised at the age of eight days.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For the entirety of my faith’s existence, Jewish people have 
circumcised their sons,
2
 both in times of normalcy and in times of great 
adversity, persecution, and death.  The ritual of circumcision survived the 
Roman conquest,
3
 the Babylonian conquest,
4
 and even the concentration 
                                                                                                                          
* The George Washington University, B.A., magna cum laude, 2008; University of Connecticut 
School of Law, J.D., 2013.  I would like to thank Professor Gordon Silverstein for his helpful feedback 
throughout the drafting of this Note.  This Note is dedicated to my parents, Bena’ and Steven Weil, for 
their unyielding love and steadfast support.  I would also like to thank Irina Lisker for her invaluable 
research assistance and unwavering encouragement.  Finally, I would like to thank the editors of the 
Connecticut Law Review for their tireless efforts throughout the editing of this Note.  Any errors 
contained herein are mine and mine alone. 
1 Genesis 17:9–12; see also Leviticus 12:2–3 (“When a woman at childbirth bears a male . . . [o]n 
the eighth day the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised.”).  All biblical citations are from TANAKH: 
A NEW TRANSLATION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES ACCORDING TO THE TRADITIONAL HEBREW TEXT 
(1985).   
2 See Aaron Glantz, Increasingly, A Ritual Is Bypassed, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2011, at A17 
(stating that Jewish parents have circumcised boys for thousands of years, following a biblical 
commandment); Brad A. Greenberg, The Circumcision Wars, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2011, at A13 (“This 
custom [of circumcision] is as old as Judaism itself.”); see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Circumcision: 
Cultural-Legal Analysis, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 497, 513 (2002) (“The Israelites practiced the 
custom beginning, according to the book of Genesis, with the circumcision of Abraham at age ninety-
nine.” (citing Genesis 17:24)).  
3 See DAVID L. GOLLAHER, CIRCUMCISION: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL 
SURGERY 15 (2000) (describing efforts by the Jews during the Roman Era to convince Roman leaders 
to allow the practice of infant male circumcision to continue); see also LEONARD B. GLICK, MARKED IN 
YOUR FLESH: CIRCUMCISION FROM ANCIENT JUDEA TO MODERN AMERICA 31 (2005) (“Although Jews 
in the Roman Empire knew that others considered circumcision barbarous, most Jewish fathers acceded 
to what they believed was a divine mandate.”); Miller, supra note 2, at 517 (describing the Bar Kohbha 
rebellion and the Roman Emperor’s futile attempt to bar circumcision).  
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camps of Nazi Europe.
5
  Muslims also practice circumcision as a religious 
rite.
6
  Recently, “Inactivists”7 in San Francisco proposed a city ordinance 
to criminalize nearly all forms of circumcision performed on males under 
age eighteen.
8
  Marc Stern, associate general counsel for legal advocacy for 
the American Jewish Committee, referred to the proposal as  “the most 
direct assault on Jewish religious practice in the United States. . . . It’s 
unprecedented in American Jewish life.”9 
Aside from representing a “direct assault” on Jewish and Muslim 
religious practice, the proposal raises serious and fundamental questions 
about the extent of religious liberty in the United States today.  The United 
States, it has been said, enjoys a “friendly” separation of church and state.10   
Alexis de Tocqueville made a similar observation, commenting:  
I have expressed enough to characterize Anglo-American 
civilization in its true colors.  This civilization is the result 
 . . . of two quite distinct ingredients, which anywhere else 
have often ended in war but which Americans have 
succeeded somehow to meld together in wondrous harmony; 
namely the spirit of religion and the spirit of liberty. . . . Far 
from harming each other, these two inclinations, despite their 
apparent opposition, seem to walk in mutual agreement and 
                                                                                                                          
4 See GOLLAHER, supra note 3, at 15 (“Antiochus Epiphanes, the draconian rules of Judea during 
the second century B.C., imposed severe penalties for circumcision as part of his assault on Judaism.” 
(citation omitted)). 
5 See Michael Gerson, Making Circumcision Criminal, WASH. POST, July 6, 2012, at A17 
(describing a circumcision at the Janowska Concentration Camp in Poland); Israel Spira, The Nazi 
Accomplice in Circumcision, CHABAD.ORG, http://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/2619/jewis
h/The-Nazi-Accomplice-in-the-Circumcision.htm  (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).  
6 See infra Part II.A.2.  
7 “Inactivist” is the term by which members of the anti-circumcision movement refer to 
themselves.  See, e.g., Mikaela Conley, Circumcision Ban to Appear on San Francisco Municipal 
Election Ballot, ABC NEWS (May 19, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/san-francisco-vote-
circumcision-ban/story?id=13638220#.UGYyT6RSTcY [hereinafter Conley, Circumcision Ban] 
(defining “inactivists” as “people who believe that infant boys have the right to keep their foreskin 
intact”).   
8 See Initiative Measure to Be Submitted Directly to the Voters: Genital Cutting of Male Minors 
(proposed Oct. 13, 2010), available at http://sfgov2.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/elections/candidates/2011Mal
eCircumcision.pdf [hereinafter San Francisco Ballot Measure].  The measure was removed from the 
ballot on July 28, 2011 by judicial order.  See Maria L. La Ganga, San Francisco Is Ordered to Halt 
Circumcision Vote, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 2011, at AA5 [hereinafter La Ganga, Judge Orders] (stating 
that a court removed the initiative from the November 2011 ballot because it was preempted by state 
law). 
9 Conley, Circumcision Ban, supra note 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
10 PHILIP SCHAFF, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES OR THE AMERICAN IDEA OF 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND ITS PRACTICAL EFFECTS 10 (Arno Press 1972) (1888) (“Such liberty is 
impossible on the basis of a union of church and state, where the one of necessity restricts and controls 
the other.  It requires a friendly separation, where each power is entirely independent in its own 
sphere.”). 
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11
 
How is it that this unique character of religious liberty described by 
Tocqueville and later Schaff came into being?  It can at least partially be 
attributed to the dualities of religious freedoms protected by the First 
Amendment: The state is forbidden from showing favoritism to any one 
religion
12
 and concomitantly is prohibited from interfering with any 
individual’s or group’s religious exercise.13    
These pages explore the contours and boundaries of the Supreme 
Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence as applied to the San Francisco 
Ballot Measure, focusing on two cases in particular: Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith
14
 and Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.
15
  This Note argues that the 
Free Exercise Clause means that, at minimum, governments may not 
outlaw religious practices—at least not without satisfying the elements of 
strict scrutiny (a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored means).
16
  
This Note will undertake a critical analysis of the Court’s concept of 
neutrality as has been applied to religious practice and will advance an 
argument for the theory of “substantive neutrality.”17  Given that the San 
Francisco Ballot Measure fails to satisfy the substantive neutrality 
principle, and since there is no compelling state interest served by a 
circumcision ban, the proposal would not be upheld under the rule 
advocated for by this Note.  
Part II of this Note will provide a brief background of the religious 
                                                                                                                          
11 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 55–56 (Gerald E. Bevan trans., Penguin 
Books 2003) (1840). 
12 See U.S. CONST. amend. I [hereinafter Establishment Clause] (“Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion.” (emphasis added)); see also Everson v. Board of Ed., 330 U.S. 
1, 15–16 (1947) (“The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.  Neither can pass laws which aid one 
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. . . . ‘In the words of Jefferson, the Clause 
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and 
State.’”(quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 146 (1878))).  
13 See U.S. CONST. amend. I [hereinafter Free Exercise Clause] (“Congress shall make no law . . . 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
14 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
15 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
16 The religion clauses of the First Amendment have been incorporated by the Court under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and are binding on the states.  Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 
(1940); see LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
149 (2d ed. 1994) (“In 1940, when the Supreme Court incorporated the free-exercise clause into the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court assumed that the establishment clause imposed upon the states the 
same restraints as upon the United States.”).  
17 Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 
DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001 (1990) [hereinafter Laycock, Formal] (noting that substantive neutrality 
understands the religion clauses to “require government to minimize the extent to which it either 
encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or 
nonobservance”).  
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motivations and social constructions of male circumcision and the medical 
debate over the procedure.  Part III discusses the text and legislative 
motives of the San Francisco ballot measure.  Subsequently, Part IV of this 
Note summarizes the Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence.  Here it 
is shown that, prior to Smith and Lukumi, the Court applied substantive 
neutrality when analyzing cases under the Free Exercise Clause.  Part V 
will analyze how a court considering the San Francisco Ballot Measure 
would apply the rules elucidated in Smith and Lukumi to the proposal, and 
it will show why analysis confined to these decisions is constitutionally 
deficient.  Here it is argued that substantive neutrality is the correct 
formulation of the neutrality requirement, and that the San Francisco Ballot 
Measure violates this principle.   
II.  BACKGROUND:  MALE CIRCUMCISION 
“Circumcision is the removal of a simple fold of skin—the ‘prepuce’ 
(or ‘foreskin’)—that covers the glans (head) of the flaccid penis.”18  This 
section provides a background discussion on the religious, cultural, and 
medical ideas and controversies surrounding male circumcision.   
A.  Religious Motivations 
1.  Judaism and the Berit Milah
19
  
In Judaism, the obligation of male circumcision is found in Genesis 
(the first book of the Pentateuch).
20
  The biblical text teaches that God 
appeared to Abram at age ninety-nine to “establish My covenant between 
Me and you.”21  Under the covenant, God promised Abraham and his 
offspring all the land of Canaan (biblical Israel).  In exchange for God’s 
promise, the Jewish people were instructed to “circumcise the flesh of your 
foreskin.”22   
This covenant established between God and Abraham is central to 
Jewish theology.  In fact, Genesis mandates that uncircumcised men be 
                                                                                                                          
18 Brian J. Morris, Why Circumcision Is a Biomedical Imperative for the 21st Century, 29 
BIOESSAYS 1147, 1147 (2007).   
19 “Berit milah” translates from Hebrew to “covenant of circumcision.”  GOLLAHER, supra note 3, 
at 24.  “The first stage of a ritual circumcision—the initial cut—is called by the Hebrew term milah.  
The Hebrew word for ‘covenant,’ in the Sephardic pronunciation now used in Israel, is brit—hence that 
term brit milah.” GLICK, supra note 3, at 6.  
20 The Pentateuch includes the first five books of the Hebrew Bible attributed to Moses:  Genesis, 
Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy.  STEPHEN PROTHERO, RELIGIOUS LITERACY: WHAT 
EVERY AMERICAN NEEDS TO KNOW—AND DOESN’T 162 (2007).  
21 Genesis 17:1–2.  
22 Id. 17:11.  
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cast out of the community.
23
  The ritual of circumcision must occur during 
the daylight hours of the child’s eighth day of life24 and takes precedence 
over other religious obligations, including the obligation to refrain from 
labor on the Sabbath or Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the year.
25
   
One scholar has offered this description of a typical bris
26
: 
The bris is a joyous occasion to which guests are invited 
from near and far.
 
 If possible, ten men constitute a minyan, 
or quorum required under religious law, to conduct worship 
services.  The parents select a godmother and a godfather 
(sandak) for the ceremony.  The mother hands the child to the 
godmother, who in turn passes him to the godfather, whose 
job is to hold the child during the miloh (cutting).  The ritual 
expert, or mohel, performs the operation and recites the 
prescribed prayers.
  
At the mezizah, the traditional (but now 
largely abandoned) culmination of the ritual, the mohel sips 
wine and sucks the infant's penis, spitting the mixture of 
blood and wine into a glass.  Afterwards, the assembled 
crowd joins in a festive meal, the suedo shel mitzvo.
27
  
Aside from (or perhaps divorced from) the religious obligation, 
circumcision is a form of expressive conduct in the Jewish faith, signifying 
one’s Jewish identity and place in the religion (and that of his or her 
child).
28
  “A circumcised penis is a symbol of identity among Jews; it 
distinguishes the Jew from the non-Jews.  It not only signifies the 
covenant, but also signifies a people that have suffered persecution 
throughout the ages.”29  This suggests that rather than being merely a 
Halakhic obligation, circumcision carries great cultural significance for 
Jewish people.  For example, Leonard Glick argues that “Jews expect boys 
to be circumcised, simply as a time-honored ethnic custom, divorced from 
                                                                                                                          
23 Id. 17:14 (“[I]f any male who is uncircumcised fails to circumcise the flesh of his foreskin, that 
person shall be cut off from his kin; he has broken My covenant.”).   
24 Miller, supra note 2, at 514 (stating that Jewish tradition holds that circumcision shall occur on 
the eighth day after birth).  
25 GOLLAHER, supra note 3, at 24; Greenberg, supra note 2, at A13.  
26 “Bris” is the term familiar to most Americans to describe the circumcision ritual. GLICK, supra 
note 3, at 6. 
27 Miller, supra note 2, at 514.  Glick’s description of the Jewish circumcision ritual is less 
sanguine.  See GLICK, supra note 3, at 7–8 (describing the Jewish circumcision ritual).  
28 Miller, supra note 2, at 521 (“For Jews, circumcision was by far the most salient mark of 
identity—it was the feature that distinguished a Jew from other peoples, a covenant demanded by God 
for all Jews.  Circumcision, said Maimonides, was a reliable indicator of a person’s Jewish identity 
because it was painful. . . . Circumcision for Jews was an essential mark of self and, accordingly, was 
highly esteemed within Jewish culture.”); see also GLICK, supra note 3, at 8 (stating that for many 
Jewish parents, circumcision “somehow helps to ‘make the boy Jewish’”). 
29 Abbie J. Chessler, Comment, Justifying the Unjustifiable: Rite v. Wrong, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 555, 
584 (1997).  
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historical or theological context.”30  
2.  Islam and Male Circumcision  
Although never mentioned in the Qur’an, circumcision is widely 
practiced among Islamic people as a religious obligation;
31
 the ritual has 
been part of the Islamic tradition since the ninth century.
32
   
Unlike the strict eight days of Judaism, the time when the procedure is 
performed among Muslims is not uniform.
33
  Circumcision is sometimes 
performed only once the boy is able to read the Qur’an.34  Other Muslims 
perform the ritual during the child’s infancy, perhaps as early as the 
seventh day of life
35
 while still others perform the circumcision during 
puberty.
36
    
3.  Christianity and Circumcision  
Christianity has never required circumcision as an act of religious 
faith.
37
  Early Christians rejected circumcision, and its significance became 
a mark of distinction between Christians and non-Christians.
38
  
Recognizing that importing circumcision into Christianity would be 
unpalatable and hurt his evangelizing efforts, the Apostle Paul excised the 
practice from the new religion, explaining that Jesus had subsumed the old 
covenant between God and Abraham, which rendered circumcision 
irrelevant.
39
  According to one scholar, “The Church abandoned 
circumcision under the doctrine that Christ had abolished circumcision and 
                                                                                                                          
30 GLICK, supra note 3, at 9.  Glick estimates that less than ten percent of Jews who practice 
circumcision are strictly observant, or are even aware of the Biblical covenant.  Id.  
31 See GLICK, supra note 3, at 5. 
32 Id. at 317 n.80; see also Chessler, supra note 29, at 585 (“Most Muslims consider circumcision 
essential and a sunna, an action of the prophet, which indicates that all past prophets performed it.  
There are many narrative reports which demonstrate that circumcision was a sunna at the time of 
Muhammad.”).  
33 See GOLLAHER, supra note 3, at 46 (noting that Muslim clerics have never agreed on a 
standardized time for the ritual); see also Miller, supra note 2, at 514 (stating there is no set time for 
circumcision in Islamic cultures, but the procedure must occur before the male reaches adulthood).   
34 Chessler, supra note 29, at 585.  
35 GLICK, supra note 3, at 283 n.3 (“Although the Muslim code of religious law (shariah) 
recommends performance of circumcision at the age of seven days, this is seldom followed.”).  
36 Thirteen years of age is generally taken as the latest acceptable age for circumcision among 
Muslims.  Abraham circumcised Ishmael, the putative father of the Arab people, at age thirteen.  Id.   
37 Miller, supra note 2, at 517.  
38 See GLICK, supra note 3, at 6 (“Until fairly recently Christians not only rejected but often 
vilified circumcision; from Paul’s time onward they interpreted the practice as prime evidence that 
Judaism was so fixated on irrelevant physical concerns that spiritual life was beyond reach.”); Miller, 
supra note 2, at 518 (stating that circumcision “became a mark, for Christians, of how they were 
different from Jews”).  
39 GLICK, supra note 3, at 36–37; see also Miller, supra note 2, at 517 (“Paul, the apostle to the 
Gentiles, viewed circumcision as meaningless and irrelevant.”).  
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other ritual separations between Jew and Gentile.”40  For Christians, the 
rite of initiation (for both males and females) is the baptism.
41
   
B.  The Cultural Norm of Male Circumcision 
Circumcision ranks amongst the most common surgical procedures 
performed on newborn males worldwide
42
 and in 2005, it was the third 
most commonly performed surgery in the United States.
43
  Hospitals in the 
U.S. performed more than 1.2 million circumcisions in 2005.
44
 
The procedure is common internationally, as “[g]lobally over 25% of 
men are circumcised.”45  Rates of circumcision in the United States have 
declined from their peak during the 1950s when 90% of newborn males 
were circumcised in response to advice from the medical community about 
the procedure’s beneficial effects.46  According to the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (“CDC”), in 1999, 65% of all males born in U.S. 
hospitals were circumcised.
47
  That number fell to 56% of newborns prior 
to leaving the hospital in 2005,
48
 with some reports suggesting the number 
might be even lower.
49
  Among Jewish American men, 98% have been 
circumcised.
50
  Since Jews and Muslims comprise approximately 3% of the 
U.S. population, it has been estimated that only 10% of the circumcisions 
performed in the U.S. are religiously motivated.
51
 
                                                                                                                          
40 Miller, supra note 2, at 517–18. 
41 GLICK, supra note 3, at 6–7.  
42 See Circumcision (Male), MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/circumcision/MY
01023 (last visited Sept. 8, 2012) (“Circumcision is fairly common for newborn boys in certain parts of 
the world, including the United States.”).  But see GLICK, supra note 3, at 4–5 (stating that the United 
States stands apart from the world in widespread circumcision of male newborns).  
43 Chaya T. Merrill et al., Statistical Brief #45: Circumcisions Performed in U.S. Community 
Hospitals, 2005, HEALTHCARE COST & UTILIZATION PROJECT (HCUP) (Jan. 2008),  
http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb45.jsp [hereinafter Merrill, Statistical Brief #45].  
44 Id.  
45 Morris, supra note 18, at 1147.  
46 Edward Guthmann, Circumcision Losing Favor with U.S. Parents, S.F. CHRON., June 21, 2007, 
at A1.  
47 NCHS Health E-Stat: Trends in Circumcisions Among Newborns, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/circumcisions/circumcisions.htm (last 
updated Feb. 3, 2010).  
48 Merill, supra note 43. 
49 Officials from the CDC presented findings at the International AIDS Conference in Vienna in 
2010 suggesting that just 32.5% of boys born in conventional hospitals were circumcised in 2009.  
Roni Caryn Rabin, Steep Drop Seen in Circumcisions in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2010, at D6.  
50 Glantz, supra note 2; see also Ross Povenmire, Do Parents Have the Legal Authority to 
Consent to the Surgical Amputation of Normal, Healthy Tissue from Their Infant Children?: The 
Practice of Circumcision in the United States, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 87, 91 (1999) 
(stating that circumcision is “almost universal among Jewish men”).  No figure for the rate of 
circumcision among Muslims or Christians could be obtained.  
51 See Eugene Volokh, Proposed San Francisco Circumcision Ban (with No Discussion of 
Religious Freedom in this Post), THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 23, 2011, 11:24 AM), 
http://volokh.com/2011/05/23/proposed-san-francisco-circumcision-ban-with-no-discussion-of-
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Despite its decline, circumcision remains the cultural norm in the 
United States.
52
  Given the ubiquity of the procedure and the social norms 
associated with circumcision, it is unsurprising that American parents are 
concerned that their son’s genitals look like “everyone else’s.”53  “Many 
focus on cosmetic justifications [for circumcisions], saying that they want 
their son to feel ‘comfortable’ among other boys in locker rooms, or that a 
boy should ‘look like’ his father.”54   
C.  Medical Arguments 
Advocates for and opponents of circumcision have debated, and 
continue to debate, the relative benefits and harms of circumcision.   
Medical evidence establishes that circumcision is correlated with lower 
the occurrences of urinary tract infections (“UTI”) in infants;55 circumcised 
men experience lower rates of penile and other cancers;
56
 and circumcised 
men suffer from fewer sexually transmitted infections,
57
 including human 
immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (“HIV”/ 
AIDS”).58  The World Health Organization (“WHO”) reports that 
                                                                                                                          
religious-freedom-in-this-post (estimating that 90% of circumcisions are not religiously motivated); see 
also Povenmire, supra note 50, at 91 (“The vast majority of circumcisions in the United States, 
however, are upon non-Jewish and non-Muslim men.”).  
52 See Miller, supra note 2, at 502 (“Circumcision of boys remains normative [in American 
culture], and the cultural revisionism of anti-circumcision norm entrepreneurs remains at the fringes of 
American public discourse.”). 
53 Chessler, supra note 29, at 581.  “Circumcised fathers are obsessed with conformity, wanting 
their child’s penis also to be circumcised.  They worry about the social problems an uncircumcised 
child may confront as he matures.”  Id.  A 1987 study referenced by Volokh lists the following reasons 
for non-medical circumcision:  the father being circumcised (11%); not wanting the son to look 
different from the father (18%); and “I just think it should be done” (9%).  Volokh, supra note 51.  
54 GLICK, supra note 3, at 7. 
55 See, e.g., Morris, supra note 18, at 1151 (stating there is a 2.5% incidence of urinary tract 
infection in uncircumcised boys, as compared to a 0.2% incidence in circumcised boys); Aaron A.R. 
Tobian & Ronald H. Gray, The Medical Benefits of Male Circumcision, 306 JAMA 1479, 1480 (2011);  
Kimberly K. Updegrove, An Evidence-Based Approach to Male Circumcision: What Do We Know?, 46 
J. MIDWIFERY & WOMEN’S HEALTH 415, 416 (2001) (noting that the incidence of UTI in 
uncircumcised males is twelve times higher than among circumcised men).  
56 Morris, supra note 18, at 1151 (stating that uncircumcised men have a twenty-two times higher 
incidence of penile cancer and a 1.6 to 2.0 times higher incidence of prostate cancer than circumcised 
men); Tobian & Gray, supra note 55, at 1479; Updegrove, supra note 55, at 419.  
57 Morris, supra note 18, at 1150, 1151 (stating that circumcision provides “substantial 
protection” from the sexually transmitted diseases syphilis, chancroid, herpes, and human 
papillomavirus (“HPV”)); Tobian & Gray, supra note 55, at 1479 (acknowledging that two trials 
demonstrated that circumcision reduces the risk of acquiring genital herpes by 28% to 34% and high-
risk types of HPV by 32% to 35%); Updegrove, supra note 55 at 418 (estimating that the relative risk 
of an uncircumcised man contracting gonorrhea and herpes is twice as high for uncircumcised men and 
fives times higher for candida and syphilis). 
58 See, e.g., Gray & Tobian, supra note 55, at 1479 (asserting that consistent with observational 
studies in Africa and the United States, studies in Africa show a 51% to 60% decrease in HIV 
acquisition in circumcised men); Morris, supra note 18, at 1150 (finding that circumcision provides a 
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circumcision has been shown to lower men’s risk of contracting HIV by up 
to 60%, and it is now recommended as part of a comprehensive program to 
eradicate HIV/AIDS in Africa.
59
  
Citing insufficient medical data, the American Academy of Pediatrics 
(“AAP”) does not presently recommend the procedure.60  In its policy 
statement, the AAP notes that “[i]n the case of circumcision, in which there 
are potential benefits and risks, yet the procedure is not essential to the 
child’s current wellbeing, parents should determine what is in the best 
interest of the child.”61  Further, in making this decision, “[i]t is legitimate 
for parents to take into account cultural, religious, and ethnic traditions, in 
addition to the medical factors.”62 Similarly, the CDC has not taken a 
position on the procedure.
63
 
Opponents of circumcision argue that it should be outlawed because 
removing thousands of healthy nerve endings
64
 on the infant is 
excruciatingly painful.
65
  Other common criticisms of the procedure are 
that it can involve surgical complications (such as infection, hemorrhaging, 
and scarring);
66
 that it can lead to disfigurement or loss of all or part of the 
                                                                                                                          
two-to-eight-fold protection against HIV infection and circumcision led to a 56% to 75% risk 
reduction); Updegrove, supra note 55, at 418 (acknowledging that circumcision provides an average 
two-to-three-fold reduction in the prevalence of HIV; as much as an 8.2-fold reduction has been 
reported).  
59 WORLD HEALTH ORG., TRADITIONAL MALE CIRCUMCISION IN THE CONTEXT OF HIV 
PREVENTION 8 (July 30, 2010), available at http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/malecircumcision/meetingrep
ort_tmc_apr10/en/index.html.  
60 Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Circumcision Policy Statement, 103 PEDIATRICS 686, 691 (1999), 
available at http://www.cirp.org/library/statements/aap1999.   
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
63 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Status of CDC Male Circumcision 
Recommendations, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/research/male-circumcision.htm (last updated Aug. 
27, 2009).   
64 See Email from Matthew Hess, President, MGMBILL.ORG, to Author (Oct. 31, 2011, 4:58 EST) 
(on file with author) (writing that “[c]ircumcision of either gender removes thousands of nerve endings 
and interferes with normal sexual function”).   
65 See Mark C. Alanis & Richard S. Lucidi, Neonatal Circumcision: A Review of the World’s 
Oldest and Most Controversial Operation, 59 OBSTETRICAL GYNECOLOGICAL SURVEY 379, 388 
(2004) (stating that the belief that circumcision causes minor amounts of pain has been proven false); 
Stephen Moses et al., Male Circumcision: Assessment of Health Benefits and Risks, 74 SEXUALLY 
TRANSMITTED INFECTIONS, 368, 371 (1998) (stating that “infants undergoing circumcision without 
anesthesia demonstrate physiological responses suggesting that they are experiencing pain and 
behavioral changes”); Povenmire, supra note 50, at 97 (asserting that circumcision is “known to be 
traumatic and painful for newborns . . . and results in a long-term heightened pain response”); see also 
Updegrove, supra note 55, at 420 (noting that the long held belief that circumcision causes no pain for 
the infant has been disproven).   
66 Alanis & Lucidi, supra note 65, at 389 (noting that minor bleeding and local infection are the 
most common complications of circumcision); Moses et al., supra note 65 at 371 (stating that 
complications of circumcision include infections and bleeding).  The rate of post-operative 
complications for male circumcision is 0.2% to 0.6%.  Id.; see also DOCTORS OPPOSING 
CIRCUMCISION, GENITAL INTEGRITY POL’Y STATEMENT, available at 
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penis;
67
 that it can have psychological and emotional effects, including 
sexual dysfunction;
68
 and (though exceedingly rare) that it can result in 
death.
69
    
III.  THE SAN FRANCISCO BALLOT MEASURE 
In the months following the development of this project, the San 
Francisco proposal was removed from the ballot by judicial order on an 
unrelated issue of state law.  San Francisco is preempted from legislating 
in this area because the State of California already has a law regulating 
circumcisions.
70
  Nonetheless, the constitutional question of whether a ban 
would violate the Free Exercise Clause is still alive and will likely surface 
again.
71
  For example, as the first iteration of this Note was being written, 
the proponents of the San Francisco initiative planned to resubmit the 
circumcision ban to Congress and state legislatures across the country.
72
  
Also, somewhat beyond the scope of this Note, the mainstream media 
reported in the summer of 2012 on the decision of a judge to outlaw infant 
male circumcision, finding the procedure constitutes a form of bodily harm 
and is subject to criminal penalties.
73
  
                                                                                                                          
http://www.doctorsopposingcircumcision.org/DOC/statement04.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2012) 
[hereinafter DOCTORS OPPOSING CIRCUMCISION] (listing hemorrhage, infection, and surgical mishap as 
immediate consequences of circumcision); The Facts Behind Circumcision, INTACT AM., 
http://www.intactamerica.org/learnmore (last visited Sept. 8, 2012) (stating that circumcision causes 
pain, infection, hemorrhage, and scarring).  
67 See DOCTORS OPPOSING CIRCUMCISION, supra note 66 (noting that more serious complications 
of circumcision include excision of part of the penis and amputation of the penis).  
68 See Alanis & Lucidi, supra note 65, at 390 (stating that many circumcision opponents have 
argued that removal of the foreskin causes sexual dysfunction); Moses et al., supra note 65, at 371 
(noting anecdotal claims of physiological, emotional, and sexual adverse effects from male 
circumcision).  
69 Moses et al., supra note 65, at 371 (acknowledging that two deaths were reported from 
circumcision in the United States over a twenty-five year period).  But see DOCTORS OPPOSING 
CIRCUMCISION, supra note 66  (citing a survey estimating 114 deaths in the United States annually 
from “circumcision-related causes”).  
70 See La Ganga, Judge Orders, supra note 8 (stating that San Francisco is preempted from 
banning circumcisions by the California Business and Professions Code because only the state is 
permitted to regulate medical procedures, and circumcision is a medical procedure).  
71 The proposal in San Francisco followed a similar proposal in Massachusetts during its 2009–
2010 Session.  Jessica Fargen, Plan to Ban Circumcision a Longshot, BOS. HERALD, Feb. 21, 2010, at 
6.  Additionally, MGM Bill is currently advocating for a federal and a state version of the male 
circumcision ban.  Greenberg, The Circumcision Wars, supra note 2; see also Congress and States 
Prepare for Another Circumcision Battle, MGMBILL.ORG (Jan. 24, 2012), 
http://mgmbill.org/pressrelease25.htm (noting efforts to outlaw circumcision nationally and in eleven 
states).  
72 2012 MGM Bill Submission State Office Guidelines, MGMBILL.ORG, 
http://mgmbill.org/2012.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2012).  
73 See, e.g., Benjamin Weinthal, German Court Declares Circumcision a Crime, JERUSALEM 
POST, June 27, 2012, at 6.   
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A.  Chronology and Text of the San Francisco Ballot Measure 
The San Francisco Ballot Measure was proposed by the organization 
MGM Bill.  MGM stands for “male genital mutilation.”74  The sponsors of 
the proposal present the issue in extremely stark terms, often employing 
hyperbole to frame the issue.  A group affiliated with MGM Bill, Intact 
America, explains on its website that circumcision “creates immediate 
health risks and can lead to serious complications,” which include 
“infection, hemorrhage, scarring, difficulty urinating, loss of part or all of 
the penis, and even death.”75  They also compare the practice of male 
circumcision to female circumcision,
76
 which they note is banned in the 
United States,
77
 arguing that the female version of circumcision should not 
be banned while the male version remains legal.  Other critics of 
circumcision resort to this false equation
78
 of male and female 
circumcision.
79
  
MGM Bill sees the issue as one of personal choice: If men want to be 
circumcised they should be able to choose so.  The San Francisco proposal 
allowed men to be circumcised only after they reach age eighteen and 
prevents parents from making this irreversible choice for their sons.  
Matthew Hess, President of MGM Bill, said, “We’re not trying to stop 
people from getting circumcised if they want to.  We just want to protect 
                                                                                                                          
74 See A Bill to End Male Genital Mutilation in the U.S., MGMBILL.ORG, 
http://mgmbill.org/index.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2012) (displaying headline referencing “Male Genital 
Mutilation”).  
75 The Facts Behind Circumcision, INTACT AM., http://www.intactamerica.org/learnmore  
http://www.sfmgmbill.org/Site/Home.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).  
76 Frequently Asked Questions, MGMBILL.ORG, http://mgmbill.org/faq.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 
2012) [hereinafter MGM Bill, Frequently Asked Questions] (“In the United States today, all forms of 
child female circumcision are prohibited . . . .  Males are not included in that legislation.”); Congress 
and States Prepare for Another Circumcision Battle, supra note 71 (“The [Male Genital Mutilation 
Bill] would protect boys from forced circumcision the same way that girls are protected under federal 
and state laws.”); Email from Matthew Hess, President, MGMBILL.ORG, to Author, supra note 64 (“I 
think circumcision of male children should be prohibited for the same reason that we prohibit female 
genital cutting . . . . Every person—female and male—has the right to have their body left whole, and it 
is the government’s duty to protect those who cannot protect themselves.”).   
77 18 U.S.C. § 116(a) (2006) (“Except as provided in subsection (b), whoever knowingly 
circumcises, excises, or infibulates the whole or any part of the labia majora or labia minora or clitoris 
of another person who has not attained the age of 18 years shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
not more than 5 years, or both.”).  
78 See infra Part V.B. for a discussion of the relative differences between male and female 
circumcision.   
79 See, e.g., Chessler, supra note 29, at 559 (“While concerns about female circumcision are at the 
forefront of human rights law, male circumcision, amazingly, continues to be virtually ignored.  
Although many activists and writers throughout the world condemn female circumcision, they fail to 
acknowledge the similarity between male and female circumcision, and to consequently reconsider the 
role of routine male circumcision in Western society.”). 
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children from getting it forced on them.”80  Lloyd Schofield, a retired 
employee of the hotel industry and the leader of MGM’s efforts locally in 
San Francisco, said, “The foreskin is there for a reason . . . . It’s not a birth 
defect.  It serves an important function in a man’s life, and nobody has a 
right to perform unnecessary surgery on another human being.”81 
If approved, the proposed ban would have made it “unlawful to 
circumcise, excise, cut, or mutilate the whole or any part of the foreskin, 
testicles, or penis of another person who has not attained the age of 18 
years.”82  The penalty for violating this misdemeanor offense would have 
included a fine not to exceed $1,000 and/or imprisonment.
83
  There would 
have been a medical exception in circumstances where the operation was 
performed due to “clear, compelling, and immediate medical need with no 
less-destructive alternative treatment available.”84  But when construing the 
medical exception, the proposal stated that “no account shall be taken of 
the effect on the person on whom the operation is to be performed of any 
belief on the part of that or any other person that the operation is required 
as a matter of custom or ritual.”85 
Opponents immediately challenged the proposal on grounds that it was 
preempted by California state law, which “contains a ‘clear’ prohibition” 
on these sorts of ballot measures.
86
  The court agreed that the California 
Business and Professional Code, under which the state alone is empowered 
to regulate medical procedures, expressly preempted the measure.
87
  It also 
held that the ballot measure, if approved, would violate the Free Exercise 
                                                                                                                          
80 Heather Knight, Circumcision Isn’t an Only-in-S.F. Ballot Issue, S.F. CHRON., May 29, 2011, 
at D1 [hereinafter Knight, Circumcision]; see also MGM Bill Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 
76 (“Unless there is a compelling medical reason to do so, no one has the right to cut off the working 
body part of a child.”); Email from Matthew Hess, President, MGMBILL.ORG, to Author, supra note 64 
(“Every person—female and male—has the right to have their body left whole, and it is the 
government’s duty to protect those who cannot protect themselves.”). 
81 Conley, Circumcision Ban, supra note 7.   
82 San Francisco Ballot Measure, supra note 8, § 5001.  
83 Id. § 5003. 
84 Id. § 5002(a). 
85 Id. § 5002(b).  This Author asked Mr. Hess why a medical exemption was included, but not a 
religious one.  He responded: 
This would have no teeth with a religious exemption because any parent could 
simply check a box that says, ‘I wish to circumcise my son for religious reasons.’ 
Also, there is no religious exemption for female genital cutting and we feel that 
males deserve the same protection under the law.  However, we recognize that there 
may be very rare instances where a circumcision must be performed for medical 
reasons (for example, a child gets in a serious accident that requires the foreskin be 
removed).   
Email from Matthew Hess, President, MGMBILL.ORG, to Author, supra note 64. 
86 Maria L. La Ganga, Foes Sue to Get Circumcision Ban Taken off S.F. Ballot, L.A. TIMES, June 
23, 2011, at AA3.  
87 La Ganga, Judge Orders, supra note 8.  
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rights of Jews and Muslims.
88
 
B.  MGM Bill and Charges of Anti-Semitism  
The proponents of the San Francisco proposal asserted that there was 
no malice toward Judaism or Islam on their part in offering the proposed 
ban.
89
  But some critics suggest an element of anti-Semitism, at least 
among some proponents of the ban.
90
  As evidence, critics point to a comic 
book series authored by Matthew Hess titled “Foreskin Man,”91 which 
catalogs the adventures of an Inactivist superhero on an anti-circumcision 
crusade.
92
  One such critic—the Anti-Defamation League—condemned the 
comic book for its “grotesque anti-Semitic imagery and themes” and said 
the comic was “disrespectful and deeply offensive.”93  
Tapping into “classic stereotypes of Jews,”94 the comic book features 
“a bearded, black-hatted Jew with an evil grin and a bloody blade” 
(Monster Mohel) and “a blond, buff hero” (Foreskin Man) who fights the 
evil Jewish Mohel.
95
  In the comic, Monster Mohel, holding a pair of 
bloody scissors and flanked by two armed men, appears in clothing 
traditionally worn by ultra-orthodox Jews.
96
  According to the comic, 
Monster Mohel “likes nothing more than ‘cutting into the infantile penile 
                                                                                                                          
88 Id.  
89 For example, in his email to the Author, Mr. Hess explained that, “[t]he common thread 
running through the Foreskin Man series [discussed below] is that forced circumcision of children is 
bad, not that Jews or Jewish customs are bad.”  Email from Matthew Hess, President, MGMBILL.ORG, 
to Author, supra note 64. 
90 Adam Cohen, San Francisco’s Circumcision Ban: An Attack on Religious Freedom?, TIME 
(June 13, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2077240,00.html (“Claims of 
insensitivity, however, have recently turned into charges of outright anti-Semitism. One of the 
referendum's key supporters has written a comic book, Foreskin Man, that portrays a blond, Aryan-
looking superhero doing battle with ‘Monster Mohel.’”). 
91 Mitchell Landsberg, Comic Book Stirs Outrage in Fight Over Circumcision, L.A. TIMES, June 
4, 2011, at AA1 [hereinafter Landsberg, Comic Book]; Allison Vekshin, San Francisco Circumcision 
Referendum Stirs Anti-Semitism Debate, BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2011; 12:01 AM),  
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-16/san-francisco-circumcision-ban-referendum-stirs-debate-
over-anti-semitism.html (quoting state Senator Mark Leno as referring to the comic strip’s images as 
“blatantly anti-Semitic” and stating that the images are “literally pulled from Nazi literature”).   The 
comic strip is available at http://www.foreskinman.com.  
92 Knight, Circumcision, supra note 80.   
93 ADL Says Anti-Circumcision Comic Book Offends with ‘Grotesque’ Anti-Semitic Imagery, 
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (June 3, 2011), http://www.adl.org/PresRele/ASUS_12/6064_12.htm.  
94 Will Kane, Cartoon Campaign Prompts Charges of Anti-Semitism, S.F. CHRON., June 7, 2011, 
at A1 [hereinafter Kane, Cartoon Campaign] (quoting Fred Astren, Professor of Jewish studies at San 
Francisco State University).  
95 Landsberg, Comic Book, supra note 91.  Mr. Hess has stated that the Foreskin Man character is 
a caricature of himself.  See Kane, Cartoon Campaign, supra note 94 (“Hess said he sees a bit of 
himself in Foreskin Man, noting that they both are of German ancestry and have light-colored hair.”).  
96 Landsberg, Comic Book, supra note 91.  The men are depicted wearing black suits, white 
button down dress shirts, and black hats.  
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flesh of an 8-day-old boy.’”97  The comic book states that “after the 
glorified brit milah is complete, the delicious metzitzah b’peh provides the 
icing on the cake.”98  “Metzitzah b’peh” refers to the practice of orally 
suctioning the wound after removing the foreskin of the penis to clean the 
wound.
99
  
Hess denies that the cartoon or the proposal was targeted at Jewish 
religious practices.
100
  In an email to this Author, he explained, “only one 
issue [of the Foreskin Man series] dealt with Jewish circumcision.  The 
common thread running through the Foreskin Man series is that forced 
circumcision of children is bad, not that Jews or Jewish customs are 
bad.”101 
IV.  FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
Thus far, this Note has considered the religious, cultural, and medical 
dimensions of circumcision without detailing the religious liberty interests 
at stake.  We shall now turn to the voluminous jurisprudence interpreting 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 
A.  Early Cases Interpreting the Free Exercise Clause 
1.  Reynolds v. United States
 
 
In its first Free Exercise Clause case, the Supreme Court concluded in 
Reynolds v. United States
102
 that polygamy practiced for religious reasons 
was not protected under the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution.
103
    
Convicted of violating a statute that outlawed bigamy in the Utah 
Territory,
104
 George Reynolds argued that, as a member of the Mormon 
                                                                                                                          
97 Kane, Cartoon Campaign, supra note 94 (quoting Monster Mohel, MGMBILL.ORG, 
http://www.foreskinman.com/images/monster-mohel-card-back.jpg (last visited Aug. 7, 2011)) (Hess 
says he “has no grudge against Jews, only one against those, Jewish or not, who practice 
circumcision”).  
98 Monster Mohel, MGMBILL.ORG, http://www.foreskinman.com/images/monster-mohel-card-
back.jpg (last visited Aug. 7, 2011).   
99 Andy Newman, City Questions Circumcision Ritual After Baby Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 
2005, at B5.  This procedure has been all but abandoned and only occurs in the most ultra-Orthodox 
communities.  Id.  
100 See Kane, Cartoon Campaign, supra note 94 (stating that conveying an anti-Semitic message 
in the Foreskin Man cartoon was “not the intention and not the point”).  
101 Email from Matthew Hess, President, MGMBILL.ORG, to Author, supra note 64.  
102 98 U.S. 145 (1878).  
103 See id. at 164 (concluding that Congress could prohibit religiously-motivated polygamy in the 
Utah Territory because the First Amendment protects only the right to hold religious beliefs and 
opinions, and not the right actually to engage religious conduct).  “Laws are made for the government 
of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with 
practices.”  Id. at 166.  
104 Id. at 146, 150–51.  Under the statute:  
 
 2013] THE FRIENDLY SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 711 
Church, it was his religious duty to practice plural marriage, and thus he 
had a constitutional right to do so.
105
  Therefore, the statute could not 
constitutionally be applied to him.   
While acknowledging the religious obligation on the part of Mormons 
to practice polygamy,
106
 the Court rejected Reynolds’s claim that under the 
Free Exercise Clause, he actually had the right to engage in that conduct.
107
  
Instead, the Court held that the First Amendment only denied Congress the 
power to regulate religious belief (not action).
108
  Congress had the power 
“to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of 
good order.”109  Thus, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause protects 
only the freedom to believe; it does not include a contemporaneous right to 
actually act upon that belief.
110
  
The Court in Reynolds feared that allowing religious observers to 
claim an exemption would lead to anarchy.  The Court stated: “Can a man 
excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief?  To 
permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief 
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to 
become a law unto himself.”111  The Court’s decision, however, seems 
based more on anti-Mormon animus pervasive at the time than on legal 
principle.  Specifically, the Court attacked polygamy as “odious among the 
northern and western nations of Europe” and referred to the practice as 
“almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and African people.”112  
                                                                                                                          
Every person having a husband or wife living, who marries another, whether 
married or single, in a Territory, or other place over which the United States have 
exclusive jurisdiction, is guilty of bigamy, and shall be punished by a fine of not 
more than $500, and by imprisonment for a term of not more than five years. 
Id. at 146.  Although written as a law of general application, the statute was enacted specifically with 
the purpose of eliminating religious polygamy, which had been legal under the territorial laws of Utah. 
CATHERINE COOKSON, REGULATING RELIGION: THE COURTS AND THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 7 
(2001). 
105 COOKSON, supra note 104, at 193 n.4 (stating that for nineteenth century Mormons, plural 
marriage was a religious obligation); PROTHERO, supra note 20, at 204 (listing polygamy as a religious 
belief of Mormonism until 1890). 
106 COOKSON, supra note 104, at 193 n.4.  
107 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (Reynolds’s polygamy could constitutionally be criminalized 
because, under the First Amendment, “Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere 
opinion, but was left free to reach actions”).  
108 Id. 
109 Id.  The opinion quoted from Thomas Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptist Association for 
the proposition that “the legislative powers of the Government reach actions only and not opinions.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
110 See id. at 166 (“Laws are made for the government of actions and while they cannot interfere 
with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.” (emphasis added)).   
111 Id. at 166–67. 
112 Id. at 164.  
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2.  Prince v. Massachusetts 
In Prince v. Massachusetts,
113
 the Court upheld the criminal conviction 
of Sarah Prince, a Jehovah’s Witness, who violated her state’s anti-child 
labor law by allowing her nine-year old niece (over whom she had 
guardianship)
114
 to sell the Church’s magazine on a public sidewalk. 
Having been convicted, Prince argued the both her and her niece’s 
conduct could not constitutionally be criminalized because evangelizing 
and distributing the Watchtower magazine was a religious duty for 
Jehovah’s Witness.115  The Court rejected this argument, concluding that 
that the state’s power to regulate the activities of children was more 
expansive than its authority over adults and that a state could 
constitutionally prohibit (even religiously inspired) child labor.
116
  The 
state has a vital interest in preventing harm to children, pursuant to the 
parens patriae doctrine;
117
 as such, a state may subject religious conduct to 
incidental regulation.
118
  
In Prince, the Court recognized that the parental right to direct a 
child’s religious upbringing is not without limits and may be subject to 
reasonable regulation.  The Court stated, “Parents may be free to become 
martyrs themselves.  But it does not follow [that] they are free, in identical 
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children . . . .”119  As applied here, 
the state was within its regulatory authority to regulate a child’s preaching 
on a public street.
120
  Opponents of circumcision have relied on this 
“martyr” dictum to substantiate their claims that the procedure should not 
                                                                                                                          
113 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
114 Id. at 161.  
115 Id. at 164.   
The record in Prince showed that the girl considered herself a devout Jehovah’s 
Witness and had ‘begged’ her aunt/guardian to allow her to help her distribute the 
literature. . . . If the literature had been given away instead of offered for sale the law 
would not have been applied. 
COOKSON, supra note 104, at 26.  
116 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 168–69. 
117 Id. at 166–67 (“[N]either rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation.  
Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the 
parent’s control by . . . regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor . . . . The right to practice religion 
freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the 
latter to ill health or death.”).  
118 See id. at 168–69 (holding that legislation designed to regulate children’s public activities and 
employment is within the state’s police power even when one’s “religious scruples dictate contrary 
action”).  
119 Id. at 170.  It is curious why the Court used such explosive language (“martyr”) to describe the 
conduct at issue in the case (selling magazines on a public street).  See COOKSON, supra note 104, at 27 
(“Note the strong language of ‘martyrdom’ used to describe the situation in this case, which, after all, 
involved a nine-year-old girl and her aunt offering religious literature on a public street.”).  
120 Prince, 321 U.S. at 170. 
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be permitted—for religious or any other reason.121  
B.  Sherbert, Yoder, and the Compelling Interest Test  
Through this point, the Court’s cases have given great deference to 
legislatures and have shown little regard for the religious liberty interests at 
stake.  In Sherbert v. Verner,
122
 and subsequently in Wisconsin v. Yoder,
123
 
the Court’s free exercise cases turned toward granting some modicum of 
protection to the religious liberty interests at stake with the development of 
the compelling interest test.
124
   
1.  Sherbert v. Verner 
In Sherbert, for the first time, the Court applied strict scrutiny
125
 to a 
Free Exercise challenge placing upon the state the burden of demonstrating 
that its action was justified by a “compelling state interest.”126   
Adell Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist, was fired from her job as a 
mill worker after refusing to work on Saturdays, her faith’s Sabbath.127  
The state denied her unemployment benefits because she had rejected other 
work (which would have also required her to work on Saturday) without 
what it considered to be good cause.
128
   
Reversing the courts below, Justice Brennan held that denying 
Sherbert unemployment compensation imposed an unjustifiable burden on 
her religious liberty by forcing her to choose between her financial 
livelihood and her faith.
129
  In so holding, the Court recognized that not 
only direct, but also indirect burdens of government action could implicate 
                                                                                                                          
121 See, e.g., William E. Brigman, Circumcision as Child Abuse: The Legal and Constitutional 
Issues, 23 J. FAM. L. 337, 347 (1984); Povenmire, supra note 50, at 104.  
122 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  
123 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
124 This general statement might be somewhat of an oversimplification of the Court’s free exercise 
cases during this period.  The result in Sherbert seems to conflict with a decision three years earlier, 
Braunfeld v. Brown, where the Court upheld a city’s mandatory Sunday closing law, as applied to 
Orthodox Jewish merchants.  The law indirectly placed a burden on the merchant, an Orthodox Jew 
who did not work on Saturday such that he could observe the Jewish Sabbath.  He argued that closing 
two days a week (one day for religious practice and one day by state compulsion) placed him at a 
competitive disadvantage as compared to his competitors and would force him out of business.  
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 601 (1961).  Ruling against Braunfeld, Chief Justice Warren 
concluded that the government’s goal of providing a uniform day of rest was paramount and could not 
be compromised to accommodate Braunfeld and others similarly situated.  Id. at 608–09.  
125 Where strict scrutiny is the applicable standard of review, “a law will be upheld if it is 
necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 554 & n.15 (4th ed. 2011).  
126 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.  
127 Id. at 399 & n.1.  
128 Id. at 399–401. 
129 Id. at 410 (holding that “South Carolina may not Constitutionally apply the eligibility 
provisions so as to constrain a worker to abandon his religious convictions respecting the day of rest”).  
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constitutional rights: 
The [South Carolina Employment Security Commission’s] 
ruling forces [Sherbert] to choose between following the 
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one 
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in 
order to accept work, on the other hand.  Governmental 
imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden 
upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed 
against appellant for her Saturday worship.
130
 
Under Sherbert, to uphold a rule that imposes burdens on religious 
practice, the state must show a compelling interest in promulgating the 
regulations
131
 and demonstrate that these regulations are the least intrusive 
means of achieving the state’s interest.132   
The Sherbert Court rejected the state’s purported compelling interest—
fear of fraudulent claims or dilution of the fund by making payments to 
claimants unable to find work on religious ground—as purely speculative 
and unsubstantiated.
133
  Further, even if these concerns were legitimate, the 
state failed to show that the problem could not be addressed in some other 
way that did not infringe upon Sherbert’s rights under the First 
Amendment.
134
    
2. Wisconsin v. Yoder  
Sherbert purported to establish strict scrutiny as the proper standard of 
review for evaluating Free Exercise claims.
135
  However, the Court was 
reluctant to invalidate laws on that basis.
136
  Aside from Sherbet, the only 
other case during this period where strict scrutiny was used to vindicate 
claims under the Free Exercise Clause was in the field of compulsory 
school attendance laws as applied to Amish schoolchildren in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder.
137
 
Nine years after Sherbert, the Court considered whether Amish 
students were entitled to a constitutional exemption from the state’s 
compulsory school attendance law on religious grounds, and 
concomitantly, whether their parents may be held criminally liable for 
                                                                                                                          
130 Id. at 404.  The Court concluded that in construing the state’s interest, the burden on religious 
rights is not determined solely by looking at the law’s intent; the effect or impact of the law on 
religious conduct is also relevant.  COOKSON, supra note 104, at 28.  
131 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. 
132 Id. at 407.  
133 Id. 
134 Id.  
135 See supra notes 125–126  and accompanying text.  
136 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 125, at 1297.  
137 Id.  The Court did apply strict scrutiny to strike down the ordinances at issue in Lukumi, 
discussed infra at Part IV.C.2.  
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failure to comply with the law.  Under the unique circumstances in Yoder, 
the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause prohibited Wisconsin from 
compelling school attendance of Amish children after age sixteen.
138
  
The plaintiffs in Yoder—parents of Amish school children—refused to 
enroll their teenage children in school because they believed that exposure 
to such “worldly influence” threatened the Amish values and way of life.139  
Their objection was limited to enrollment of teenage students because it 
was during that phase in life that Amish children learned self-reliance and 
obtained the skills crucial to living a life as an Amish farmer or 
housewife.
140
  In spite of these arguments, the parents were tried, 
convicted, and fined $5 each.
141
   
On appeal, the Supreme Court sided with the Amish parents, holding 
that the state’s interest in compulsory school attendance (in this case) was 
not sufficiently compelling to overcome the parents’ right to freely 
exercise their religion.
142
  The decision turned on how compulsory 
attendance infringed upon the rights of the Amish parents to steer the 
religious upbringing of their children.   
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger noted, “the record in this 
case abundantly supports the claim that the traditional way of life of the 
Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep 
religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related 
to daily living.”143  As applied, the compulsory school attendance law 
would “gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of [the Amish 
parents’] religious beliefs.”144  The Court recognized that the Amish 
parents had a legitimate interest in keeping their teenage children sheltered 
from cosmopolitan influences
145
 and that the interest advanced by the state 
in educating children was not sufficiently compelling to justify inhibiting 
                                                                                                                          
138 Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 at 234.  
139 Id. at 210 (“Old Order Amish Communities today are characterized by a fundamental belief 
that salvation requires life in a church community separate and apart from the world and worldly 
influence.”).  The Amish parents objected to sending their children to high school because “the values 
[higher education] teaches are in marked variance with Amish values and the Amish way of life; they 
viewed secondary education as an impermissible exposure of their children to a ‘worldly’ influence in 
conflict with their beliefs.”  Id. at 210–11.  
140 Id. at 211.  The Amish did not challenge compulsory school attendance up to and through the 
eighth grade, because they believed children must learn the basic skills taught in the early grades.  Id. at 
212.  
141 Id. at 208. 
142 Id. at 234.  Note that in making its ruling, the Court considered the religious freedom of the 
parents, not the children. 
143 Id. at 216.  
144 Id. at 219.  
145 See id. at 218 (“[S]econdary schooling, by exposing Amish children to worldly influences in 
terms of attitudes, goals, and values contrary to beliefs, and by substantially interfering with the 
religious development of the . . . Amish faith community at the crucial adolescent stage of 
development, contravenes the basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish faith . . . .”).  
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their religious practice.
146
   
The Court rejected the State’s argument that under the parens partiae 
doctrine, it had the power to act against the parents to advance the Amish 
children’s best interest.147  The Court reasoned that allowing the state to 
mandate two additional years of education for these Amish children would, 
in essence, allow the state to dictate the children’s religious future.148  The 
Court did cabin its expansive viewpoint on the reach of state power, 
distinguishing the case from situations involving the exercise of the police 
power, which would permit greater government regulation.
149
  The Court 
explained that “the power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise 
claim, may be subject to limitation under Prince if it appears that parental 
decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child.”150  The Court 
distinguished Yoder from Prince, noting that “[t]his case . . . is not one in 
which any harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the 
public safety, peace, order, or welfare has been demonstrated or may be 
properly inferred.”151   
C.  The Modern Regime Under Smith and Lukumi   
Today, free exercise questions are resolved under the Court’s decision 
in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. 
Smith, which was fleshed out by a subsequent decision Church of Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah. 
1.  Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon 
v. Smith 
In Smith, the Court held that “the right of free exercise does not relieve 
an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of 
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) 
conduct his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”152  
Alfred Smith and Galen Black, both members of a Native American 
Church, ingested peyote as part of a religious ceremony.
153
  Both were 
subsequently fired from their jobs as counselors at a drug treatment center 
                                                                                                                          
146 See id. at 222 (“It is one thing to say that compulsory education for a year or two beyond the 
eighth grade may be necessary when its goal is the preparation of the child for life in modern society as 
the majority live, but it is quite another if the goal of education be viewed as preparation of the child for 
life in the separated agrarian community that is the keystone of Amish faith.”).  
147 Id. at 229–30. 
148 Id. at 232.  
149 COOKSON, supra note 104, at 32. 
150 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233–34.   
151 Id. at 230.  The question of physical harm to children is considered infra at Part V.B.  
152 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United 
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).  
153 Id. at 874.  
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and denied unemployment compensation by the State of Oregon because 
their terminating offense (illegal drug use) constituted work-related 
“misconduct.”154  In its challenge to the state’s denial of this benefit, the 
Oregon Supreme Court held that Smith’s religious use of peyote fell within 
the state’s prohibition, that state law did not include an exception for 
sacramental usage, and that such prohibition did not violate the Free 
Exercise Clause.
155
  
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, rejected Smith’s 
argument (seemingly in line with Yoder) that the Free Exercise Clause 
required a religious-conduct exemption from an otherwise valid state 
law.
156
  Justice Scalia stated, “We have never held that an individual’s 
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law 
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.” 157  This statement by 
the Court, of course, cannot be squared with the Court’s holding in Yoder.  
Instead, the majority in Smith held that “the right of free exercise does not 
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral 
law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or 
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”158  As 
applied to Smith, the First Amendment did not mandate that he receive an 
exemption from Oregon’s state law prohibiting the possession of peyote 
for sacramental purposes.
159
    
To the extent that the First Amendment requires exemptions from 
neutral and generally applicable laws for religious conduct, Smith seems to 
have eviscerated Yoder.  However, rather than overrule Yoder and other 
cases granting religious exemptions, the Court recharacterized those cases 
as “hybrid situation[s]”160 in which a challenge under the Free Exercise 
Clause is brought in conjunction with other constitutional protections.
161
  
On this basis, the only claims the Court had sustained involved a free 
exercise claim in connection with freedom of speech, freedom of the press, 
or the right of parents to direct the education of their children.
162
  The 
claim raised in Smith did not present a hybrid claim since it was 
                                                                                                                          
154 Id.   
155 Id. at 876.  
156 Id. at 878.  Smith argued that his “religious motivation for using peyote” placed him “beyond 
the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at [his] religious practice, and that is 
concededly constitutional as applied to those who use drugs for other reasons.” Id.  
157 Id. at 878–79.  
158 Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in judgment)). 
159 Id. at 890.  
160 Id. at 882.  
161 Id. at 881. 
162 Id. 
 718 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:695 
“unconnected with any communicative activity or parental right.”163  
2.  Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah 
Two years after Smith, the Court considered the constitutionality of a 
series of ordinances enacted by the City of Hialeah, Florida, that outlawed 
the “sacrifice” of animals within the city.164  Sacrifice is a religious 
practice of the Santeria religious.
165
  Shortly after the Santeria Church 
announced plans to establish a house of worship in Hialeah, the City 
Council adopted a series of ordinances that prohibited the ritual sacrifice of 
animals.
166
  One ordinance “defined sacrifice as to unnecessarily kill, 
torment, torture, or mutilate an animal in a public or private ritual or 
ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption, and prohibited 
owning or possessing an animal intending to use such animal for food 
purposes.”167  However, the ordinance applied only against “any individual 
or group that ‘kills, slaughters or sacrifices animals for any type of ritual, 
regardless of whether or not the flesh is to be consumed.’”168    
Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy reaffirmed 
the rule in Smith: neutral and generally applicable laws need not be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest, even if the law has an 
incidental effect on a particular religious practice.
169
  Lukumi fleshes out 
Smith in two important ways.  First, to avoid strict scrutiny, a law must be 
both neutral and (not or) generally applicable.
170
  The Court distinguished 
laws that are facially discriminatory from those which act as a “covert 
suppression of particular religious beliefs.”171  The Free Exercise Clause 
prohibits both facial discriminatory laws and “[o]fficial action that targets 
religious conduct” but still meets the requirement of facial neutrality.172  
                                                                                                                          
163 Id. at 882.  As referenced above and discussed at considerable length below, see infra Part V, 
there are two independent arguments for how the San Francisco proposal might be challenged on free 
exercise grounds.  The first is the substantive neutrality argument (namely that the formal neutrality 
rule of Smith is inconsistent with the earlier jurisprudence and is insufficiently protective of religious 
liberty).  The second argument is that even under the rule in Smith, the proposal could not stand 
because it represents both a parental rights/free exercise violation and/or a communicative activity/free 
exercise violation.  
164 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 527–28 (1993).  
165 Animal sacrifice is a principal form of worship in the Santeria religion.  Id. at 524 (“The basis 
of the Santeria religion is the nurture of a personal relation with the orishas, and one of the principal 
forms of devotion is an animal sacrifice.”).   
166 Id. at 525–26 (discussing the Church’s announcement to plan construction in April 1987 and 
the ordinances that were enacted beginning in June 1987). 
167 Id. at 527 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
168 Id.  
169 Id. at 531 (citing Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at  879).   
170 See id. (“Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and . . . failure to satisfy one 
requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied.”).    
171 Id. at 534 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986)).   
172 Id. 
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“The Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility which is 
masked as well as overt.”173  (The laws at issue in Lukumi fell into the 
second category.)  Second, if a law fails to satisfy the requirements of 
Smith because it is not both neutral and generally applicable, then it must 
be justified by a compelling interest and narrowly tailored to advance that 
interest to survive judicial review.
174
   
As applied to the ordinances at issue in Lukumi, the Court concluded 
that they were neither neutral nor generally applicable.
175
  The ordinances 
were not neutral because their objective was to ban the Santeria religious 
practice of animal sacrifice within the City of Hialeah.
176
  As evidence of 
this intent, the Court looked to the language of the ordinances, which 
prohibited “sacrifice” and “ritual.”177  Furthermore, the text of the 
ordinances made evident that the only conduct subject to the ordinances 
was the religious practice of Santeria.
178
  The Court reasoned that by 
allowing some exceptions—for example, the slaughter of animals in 
accordance with the Jewish custom of kosher—any veneer of neutrality 
disappeared.
179
  The Court called the ordinances a “gerrymander,” 
explaining how “careful drafting ensured that, although Santeria sacrifice 
is prohibited, killings that are no more necessary or humane in almost all 
other circumstances are unpunished.”180  In addition, the Court concluded 
that the law was not generally applicable because it was under-inclusive: 
only killings performed for the purpose of ritual sacrifice were prohibited 
while copious other types of killings were either not prohibited or 
expressly exempted from the reach of the ordinances.
181
  
Having concluded that the law was neither neutral nor generally 
applicable, the analysis turned to a Yoder-like strict scrutiny 
                                                                                                                          
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 531–32; see also id. at 546 (“A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not 
of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.”).  
175 See id. at 524 (“The challenged laws had an impermissible object; and in all events the 
principle of general applicability was violated because the secular ends asserted in defense of the laws 
were pursued only with respect to conduct motivated by religious beliefs.”).  
176 Id. at 534 (stating that the object of the ordinances was the “suppression of the central element 
of the Santeria worship service”).  
177 Id. (finding that use of the words “sacrifice” and “ritual” constitutes evidence of discriminatory 
intent).    
178 Id. at 535.  
179 See id. at 536 (“The definition excludes almost all killings of animals except for religious 
sacrifice, and the primary purpose requirement narrows the proscribed category even further, in 
particular by exempting kosher slaughter. . . . It suffices to recite this feature of the law as support for 
our conclusion that Santeria alone was the exclusive legislative concern.” (citations omitted)).  
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 543–45 (giving examples of legal and exempted killings of animals, inter alia, fishing, 
mice and rat extermination, and euthanasia of stray animals).   
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examination.
182
  Under the compelling interest test, the ordinances were 
unconstitutional because they were not sufficiently narrowly tailored: the 
city could have achieved its purported objective, the safe and sanitary 
disposal of animal remains, without targeting Santeria.
183
  Also, the Court 
reasoned that given the under-inclusiveness of the ordinances—written to 
apply only to a small subset of conduct, specifically that having to do with 
a religious motive—the interests asserted by the government could not be 
all that compelling.
184
 
V.  THE SAN FRANCISCO BALLOT MEASURE, THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE, 
AND SUBSTANTIVE NEUTRALITY 
The case law outlined in the previous section sets forth the analytical 
framework for evaluating the constitutionality of the San Francisco 
proposal.  Whether or not the proposal is constitutional turns on how 
neutrality is defined and applied by the Court.  In applying the neutrality 
requirement, this Note argues that the Court should adopt the definition 
articulated by one scholar: substantive neutrality.  
A.  General Applicability and Neutrality  
Under the present rule, the Court would only need to find that the San 
Francisco proposal is of general application and formally (and/or 
objectively) neutral to survive constitutional scrutiny.  This section argues 
that this standard is an insufficient protector of our religious liberty, and 
therefore should be abandoned in favor of a rule that more properly 
accommodates religious practices.  
1.  General Applicability  
Unlike the ordinances at issue in Lukumi,
185
 the San Francisco Ballot 
Measure is a law of general application because it does not target a 
religious group.  The conduct regulated by the proposal differs from other 
conduct examined earlier in this Note—bans on ritual sacrifice or 
polygamy—because circumcision is a majoritarian conduct practiced by a 
                                                                                                                          
182 See id. at 546 (requiring that a law that is not neutral or generally applicable “must undergo the 
most rigorous of scrutiny,” meaning that such a law “must advance ‘interests of the highest order’ and 
must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests” (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 
(1978), quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972))). 
183 Id.  
184 Id. at 546–47.  
185 The four ordinances in Lukumi were not generally applicable because they failed to prohibit 
the same non-religious conduct that was implicated by the Santeria sacrifice of animals: protecting 
public health and preventing animal cruelty.  Id. at 543.  Similarly, the ordinance exempted the 
commercial slaughter of small numbers of hogs and/or cattle, while prohibiting analogous religious 
conduct.  Id. at 545.  
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large segment of the population.
186
  As mentioned previously, it has been 
estimated that only 10% of circumcisions in the United States are 
performed for religious purposes.
187
  Given the ubiquity of circumcision in 
the United States, the proposed ban does not attempt to regulate a conduct 
only engaged in by a small religious minority.
188
  To the contrary, the 
proposal is written extremely broadly and specifically excludes religion as 
a valid reason for granting an exemption.
189
  Therefore, it is generally 
applicable vis-à-vis religion.  Whether it is neutral is a separate inquiry 
entirely.  
One reason that the Court in Lukumi ruled those ordinances were not 
generally applicable was because of their under-inclusiveness (the 
ordinances were written to exclude many types of animal killings and 
exempted many others, such that the only forms of animal killing that were 
prohibited, effectively, were those engaged in for religious motivations).  
By way of contrast, the San Francisco proposal contains only a single 
exemption: circumcisions may be performed on males under age eighteen 
only when medically necessary.
190
  It could be argued, based on Lukumi, 
that this exemption makes the law under-inclusive because exempting 
circumcision for one reason undermines the purpose of the entire 
legislative project.
191
  But this type of exemption is different from the 
exemptions the Court found constitutionally impermissible in Lukumi.  It 
does not appear that the drafters included this exemption so that the law 
would apply only to a narrow subset of circumcisions (as the drafter of the 
Lukumi ordinances intended that proposal to apply only to Santeria 
sacrifice).  Rather, the San Francisco proposal is written to apply as widely 
as possible.
192
  The proposal includes a single, narrowly written exception 
                                                                                                                          
186 As discussed above, circumcision is the most widely performed surgical procedure among 
newborn males in the United States and approximately eighty percent of men in the United States have 
been circumcised.  See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.   
187 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.  
188 If the proposal did attempt to regulate conduct that was only engaged in by a religious 
minority, then it would be constitutionally suspect.  See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or.  v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (“[A] State would be ‘prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]’ if it 
sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only 
because of the religious belief that they display.”).  
189 See San Francisco Ballot Measure, supra note 8, § 5002(a) (medical exemption to San 
Francisco Ballot Measure).  
190 See id. (“A surgical operation is not a violation of this section if the operation is necessary to 
the physical health of the person on whom it is performed because of a clear, compelling, and 
immediate medical need with no less-destructive alternative treatment available, and is performed by a 
person licensed in the place of its performance as a medical practitioner.”).  
191 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542 (1993) (“All 
laws are selective to some extent, but categories of selection are of paramount concern when a law has 
the incidental effect of burdening religious practice.”).  
192 For example, the medical exemption in the San Francisco proposal is followed by a subsection 
stating that, “[i]n applying subsection (a), no account shall be taken of the effect on the person on 
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for occasions when circumcision is deemed medically necessary.  The 
purpose of this medical exception is consistent with the broad purpose of 
the proposal, namely protecting the health, safety, and bodily integrity of 
the child.
193
  
The law might also be challenged as under-inclusive because it applies 
only to circumcisions performed on persons under eighteen; adult men 
would be free to undergo circumcision at will.  However, allowing 
circumcisions to be performed on adults, but not minors, does not 
compromise the legislative purpose.  The sponsors of the proposal see 
circumcision as a matter of personal choice.
194
  Thus, permitting adult men 
to be circumcised, but not infant boys, would be consistent with the 
legislative intent of the proposal.  Further, since most circumcisions 
(religious and secular) are performed on boys in their infancy,
195
 this would 
not create an opening to argue that the text is drafted to target only 
religious circumcisions (which, at least in the case of Judaism, mandate 
circumcision be performed on the child’s eighth day of life). 
2.  Neutrality  
In addition to being generally applicable, to avoid a strict scrutiny 
analysis, a law must also be neutral.
196
  Whether a law is neutral, however, 
turns on how neutrality is defined.  It is on this prong that this Note argues 
that the San Francisco proposal is most ripe for review and it is here where 
the flaws of the Court’s present doctrine become apparent.  Given the 
opportunity, the Court should jettison its present definition of neutrality 
and adopt substantive neutrality as the correct understanding of neutrality.  
                                                                                                                          
whom the operation is to be performed of any belief on the part of that or any other person that the 
operation is required as a matter of custom or ritual.”  San Francisco Ballot Measure, supra note 8, § 
5002(b).  
193 But see Christopher C. Lund, Exploring Free Exercise Doctrine: Equal Liberty and Religious 
Exemptions, 77 TENN. L. REV. 351, 361 (2010) (“How many secular exceptions do there need to be 
before a religious claim under the Free Exercise Clause becomes possible?”).  Lund refers to this as the 
“‘multiple secular baseline’ problem.”  Id.  Under the Equal Liberty theory, a secular medical 
exemption would potentially open the door to a religious one.  See id. at 362 (criticizing Equal Liberty 
analysis when applied to free exercise questions and writing that the analysis devolves “into the same 
general applicability inquiry it seeks to replace”).  Still, even the Equal Liberty critique falls short 
where, as here, there is only a single exception.  Thus, the multiple secular exceptions of the problems 
identified in Lukumi are not present.  
194 Email from Matthew Hess, President, MGMBILL.ORG to Author, supra note 64 (“We support 
every man’s right to undergo circumcision for any reason if he chooses to do so.  All we are saying is 
that it shouldn’t be forced on him.”). 
195 See Merrill, Statistical Brief #45, supra note 43 (stating that the majority of circumcisions in 
the United States are performed on newborn babies).  
196 See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531 (“Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and . . . 
failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not be satisfied.”).  
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  a.  Facial (Formal) Neutrality    
In Smith, Justice Scalia defined neutrality to mean nothing more than 
facial neutrality: “[A] state would be ‘prohibiting the free exercise [of 
religion]’ if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are 
engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that 
they display.”197  An example given by the Court of a law that would not 
be facially neutral was one that banned statues used for religious purposes 
because it created a religious category (“worship purposes”) and singled 
out that category for disparate treatment.
 198
  (Apparently, under the Court’s 
myopic viewpoint, a law banning all statutes would not violate the Free 
Exercise Clause, even though many religions practice idolatry.)  
What the Court refers to as facial neutrality, Douglas Laycock terms 
“formal neutrality.”  By his terminology, “[a] law is formally neutral if it 
does not use religion as a category—if religious and secular examples of 
the same phenomenon are treated exactly the same.”199  Formal neutrality 
sees neutrality as a proxy for equality, and requires simply that religious 
and non-religious occurrences of the same phenomena be treated 
identically, without considering the reasons behind the conduct (or the 
effect a perfectly well-intentioned law has on religious practice).
 200
 Under 
a formal neutrality regime, religious exemptions would be unconstitutional 
because they create a religious classification.
201
 
If formal neutrality is the ultimate test of the neutrality standard,
202
 
then the San Francisco proposal is constitutional even if there is no 
compelling state interest for the circumcision ban.  The proposal does not 
create any religious categories.  Rather, it criminalizes the circumcision of 
                                                                                                                          
197 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (quoting U.S. 
CONST. amend. I); see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“In my view, the defect of lack of neutrality applies primarily to laws that by their terms 
impose disabilities on the basis of religion . . . .”); Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 
110 W. VA. L. REV. 51, 57 & n.30 (2007) [hereinafter Laycock, Revisited] (citing Smith for the 
proposition that the Court equates neutrality with formal neutrality).  
198 Smith, 494 U.S. at 877–78. 
199 Laycock, Revisited, supra note 197, at 54. 
200 See Laycock, Formal, supra note 17, at 999 (noting that formal neutrality “is closely akin to 
the equal treatment and equal opportunity side of the affirmative action dentate”); see also Laycock, 
Revisited, supra note 197, at 55 (noting that formal neutrality requires neutral categories, whereas 
substantive neutrality demands neutral incentives).  
201 Laycock, Formal, supra note 17, at 1000.  For example, under Prohibition, the exception for 
sacramental wine would have been unconstitutional under a formal neutrality regime, as it would have 
treated religious and non-religious occurrences of the same conduct differently.  Id. 
202 For a discussion of why formal neutrality is an insufficient standard, see Alan Brownstein, 
Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 55, 56 (2006) (Critics of Smith argue 
that “[b]y limiting judicial review to only those situations in which the government discriminates 
against religious beliefs or practices, and refusing to protect religious activities against substantial 
burdens imposed by neutral and general laws, the Court was not taking religious liberty seriously.”); 
Laycock, Formal, supra note 17, at 999–1001 (critiquing formal neutrality).  
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any person under age eighteen (save those performed pursuant to the 
narrow medical exemption).
203
  By contrast, if the law had banned “brit 
milah,” or “circumcisions performed for religious purposes,” under Smith 
and Lukumi it would not be neutral and thus not upheld.  But under a test 
that examines only the categories—as Justice Scalia set down in Smith— 
the San Francisco proposal would be neutral (and since I have already 
concluded that it is generally applicable, the Court would uphold it without 
even needing to perform the strict scrutiny analysis).  Upholding the 
proposal on this basis—despite the fact that it would prevent a long held 
religious tradition from being performed—“could not be reconciled with 
any concept of religious liberty worthy of the name.”204  Surely the 
Constitution requires more than this pyrrhic notion of equality.  
  b. Object Neutrality   
The decision in Lukumi suggests that the Constitution requires more 
than simple formal neutrality: It also requires what shall hereinafter be 
referred to as object neutrality.  The Court explained: “[I]f the object of a 
law is to infringe upon or restrict practices [engaged in] because of their 
religious motivation, the law is not neutral . . . .”205  The ordinances in 
Lukumi were struck down on this basis because the object of the legislation 
was the “suppression of the central element of the Santeria worship 
service”206—referring to animal sacrifice.  
Even proponents of the San Francisco proposal would concede that 
their goal was to ban the practice of circumcision in the city, whether 
engaged in for religious or secular reasons.
207
  The more complicated 
matter is determining whether the proponents’ objective was to target the 
religious behavior, as such, or if that was merely an incidental effect of a 
broader legislative project. 
Proving another person’s objective is difficult and speculative at best.  
The strongest evidence of anti-Semitism as a motivating factor for the San 
Francisco proposal is the Foreskin Man cartoon featuring “Monster 
Mohel.”208  Religious circumcisions constitute a tiny minority (less than 
ten percent) of the circumcisions performed in the United States.
209
  Thus, 
it is curious why Hess chose to focus the comic strip on Jewish 
                                                                                                                          
203 San Francisco Ballot Measure, supra note 8, § 5001.  
204 Laycock, Formal, supra note 17, at 1000.  
205 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1992).  
206 Id. at 534.  
207 Email from Matthew Hess, President, MGMBILL.ORG to Author, supra note 64 (stating that 
the most common argument against the proposal is that it “would violate parents’ freedom of religion” 
but “parents aren’t legally allowed to cut off other healthy body parts from their children, so why 
should we make an exception for the foreskin?”). 
208 See supra Part III.B (discussing anti-Semitism in the comic book series titled “Foreskin Man”). 
209 Supra note 51 and accompanying text.  
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circumcisions and demonize the ritual and those who perform it.
210
  The 
portrayal of Jewish circumcision in these comics is misleading and, thus, 
suspicious.  Also, by its terms, the proposal explicitly forbids any 
accommodation for circumcision performed as a religious rite when 
applying the health exception.
211
  But since religious circumcisions make 
up such a small percentage of the procedures performed in the United 
States, why was it necessary to bar a religious exemption?  The proposal 
did not single out circumcisions performed for cultural purposes, but, as 
has been shown above, many more circumcisions are performed for 
cultural rather than religious purposes.  Since so few people could take 
advantage of the religious exemption, the law could accommodate the 
religious practice (by exempting religious circumcisions) without 
sacrificing its legitimate secular objective.
212
 
The proponents of the San Francisco proposal deny anti-Semitism was 
a motivating factor behind the proposal.  They claim their objective was 
simply to protect all children from forced circumcision, not to target 
Jewish or Muslim religious practices, as such.
213
  And it must be 
acknowledged that, given the ubiquity of the procedure in the United States 
and the small number of religious circumcisions performed, the motivation 
was not likely an attack on Jews and Muslims.
214
  For these reasons, it 
would be difficult to sustain an argument that the law is not neutral by 
virtue of some impermissible object.
215
 
c. Substantive Neutrality   
Does the Free Exercise Clause—and the values it sought to codify and 
                                                                                                                          
210 Hess defends that only one issue of the Foreskin Man comic book focused on Jewish 
circumcision.  He wrote to the Author that “[t]he common thread running through the Foreskin Man 
series is that forced circumcision of children is bad, not that Jews or Jewish customs are bad.”  Email 
from Matthew Hess, President, MGMBILL.ORG to Author, supra note 64. 
211 San Francisco Ballot Measure, supra note 8, § 5002(b).  
212 Hess claims that a religious exemption could not have been included because the proposal 
“would have no teeth with a religious exemption because any parent could simply check a box that says 
‘I wish to circumcise my son for religious reasons.’”  Email from Matthew Hess to Author, supra note 
64.  Notice that Hess does not argue that circumcision is so harmful that a religious exemption could 
never be justified, but instead raises a concern about how an exemption might be implemented.  
213 See id. (“The common thread running through the Foreskin Man series is that forced 
circumcision of children is bad, not that Jews or Jewish customs are bad.”).  
214 The San Francisco Ballot Measure is more like the law at issue in Smith (a general criminal 
prohibition having an incidental effect on religious observers) than the ordinances struck down in 
Lukumi (an ordinance written with the objective of outlawing conduct performed only by a minority 
religion, which excluded or exempted similar conduct performed for secular reasons). See supra notes 
158–159, 177–181and accompanying text.   
215 See Eugene Volokh, Proposed San Francisco Circumcision Ban, and Religious Freedom, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 23, 2011, 12:25 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2011/05/23/proposed-san-
francisco-circumcision-ban-and-religious-freedom/ (stating that courts require strong evidence to set 
aside a law that is neutral on its face vis-à-vis religion).  
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protect—require simply facial (and/or object) neutrality, or does it also 
require something more?  A third way of understanding the neutrality 
requirement, the way this Notes advocates, is that the First Amendment 
requires that laws also be substantively neutral.   
Substantive neutrality is concerned with the incentives (and 
disincentives) created by law vis-à-vis religious conduct.
216
  Laycock 
believed that “substantive neutrality insists on minimizing government 
influence on religion.”217  A law is substantively neutral to the extent that it 
does not encourage nor discourage religious conduct or belief.
218
  Laycock 
elegantly writes that substantive neutrality means that:  
Government should not interfere with our beliefs about 
religion either by coercion or by persuasion.  Religion may 
flourish or wither; it may change or stay the same.  What 
happens to religion is up to the people acting severally and 
voluntarily; it is not up to the people acting collectively 
through government.
219
 
Laycock offers the following example to explain the difference 
between a law that is formally neutral and one that is substantively neutral.  
A statute that states that “[c]hildren cannot consume alcoholic beverages in 
any amount for any purpose” is formally neutral because religion is not a 
category under the law and alcohol is forbidden to be consumed by all 
children, whether for a religious purpose or otherwise.
220
  The law, 
however, is not substantively neutral because by (implicitly) forbidding 
children from taking communion, it discourages adherents from engaging 
in an act essential to the Catholic worship service.
221
   
An exemption to the hypothetical law described above would be 
substantively neutral because it is unlikely that this accommodation would 
incentivize anyone to engage in a religious act unless he was inclined to do 
                                                                                                                          
216 Laycock, Revisited, supra note 197, at 65 (writing that substantive neutrality is about 
“[n]eutral incentives, neither encouraging nor discouraging religion” and stating that this theory offers 
“a coherent conception of neutrality that is consistent . . . with regulatory exemptions for religious 
behavior”).  
217 Id.  
218 Id. at 54–55; see also Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith 
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1146–47 (1990) (advocating for incentive neutrality, whereby “free 
exercise exemptions [are given] to ensure that incentives to practice a religion are not adversely 
affected by government action”).  
219 Laycock, Formal, supra note 17, at 1002. 
220 Laycock, Revisited, supra note 197, at 55.  For much the same reasons, the San Francisco 
proposal is formally neutral. 
221 See id. (explaining that “[f]orbidding children to take communion wine, or criminally 
punishing their parents and the priest who gives them the sacrament, powerfully discourages an act of 
worship”).  That is why, during Prohibition, the National Prohibition Act, which forbade the sale or 
consumption of alcoholic beverages in the United States, exempted the use of sacramental wine.  
Laycock, Formal, supra note 17, at 1000.  
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so anyway.  Few people are likely to convert to Catholicism or even attend 
Catholic Church services more regularly because their children would get 
to taste (literally) a sip of wine––the exception being those who already 
desired to do so, until being deterred by the government’s prohibition.222  
Thus, the hypothetical law is not substantively neutral, but an exemption to 
it is, because the latter does not change anyone’s incentives; it does not 
create an impetus for religious conduct that did not already exist, whereas 
the former creates a significant disincentive for engaging in the religious 
activity.
223
  But it must be conceded that, to the extent that an exemption 
incentivizes religious conduct, the motive for which did not already exist, 
there would be a potential claim under the Establishment Clause.  
Justice Souter’s concurrence in Lukumi vigorously argues for 
substantive neutrality.
224
  Like Laycock, Justice Souter argues that 
neutrality means more than simply the absence of government hostility 
toward a particular religious group.
225
  Rather, the Free Exercise Clause 
requires not just formal neutrality, but also substantive neutrality.  As 
Justice Souter wrote, “A law that is religion neutral on its face or in its 
purpose may lack neutrality in its effect by forbidding something that 
religion requires or requiring something that religion forbids.”226  After 
reviewing recent scholarship on the history and original meaning of the 
Free Exercise Clause,
227
 Justice Souter concludes:    
There appears to be a strong argument from the Clause’s 
development in the First Congress, from its origins in the 
post-Revolution state constitutions and pre-Revolution 
colonial charters, and from the philosophy of rights to which 
the Framers adhered, that the Clause was originally 
understood to preserve a right to engage in activities 
                                                                                                                          
222 Laycock, Revisited, supra note 197, at 55.  Without the exemption, it would have been a crime 
to take Communion or conduct a traditional Passover Seder during Prohibition.  Laycock, Formal, 
supra note 17, at 1000.  
223 Laycock, Revisited, supra note 197, at 55.   
224 Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Smith embraced substantive neutrality as well.  She would 
have denied the claimant’s unemployment compensation because she believed that the State’s interest 
in uniform application of its drug control laws was sufficiently compelling to infringe upon religious 
liberty.  See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 903–06 (1990) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (applying the compelling interest test to affirm the 
appellants’ convictions under Oregon state law). 
225 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 565 (1993) 
(Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (writing that “[o]ur cases have established 
that ‘[t]he free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the 
observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental 
interest justifies the burden’”(quoting Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 
U.S. 378, 384–85 (1990))).  
226 Id. at 561.  
227 See id. 574–76 (stating that “recent scholarship rais[es] serious questions about the Smith 
rule’s consonance with the original understanding and purpose of the Free Exercise Clause”).  
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necessary to fulfill one’s duty to one’s God, unless those 
activities threatened the rights of others or the serious needs 
of the State.
228
   
Accordingly, Justice Souter would hold that the neutrality needed to 
implement the purpose of the Framers “be the substantive neutrality of our 
pre-Smith cases, not the formal neutrality sufficient for constitutionality 
under Smith.”229 
Under a substantive neutrality rule, the San Francisco proposal would 
not be upheld to the extent it applied to religious practice (absent a 
compelling state interest) because it disincentivizes religious adherents 
from engaging in their religion’s prescribed conduct.  Substantive 
neutrality requires neutral incentives, and to the extent that it criminalizes 
circumcision and imposes monetary penalties and incarceration on those 
who perform that act, the law creates an impermissible disincentive from 
engaging in religious conduct.
230
  Unlike an object neutrality regime, where 
the intent of the law (or its sponsors) matters, substantive neutrality does 
not care about intentions, only incentives. 
An exemption to the San Francisco proposal for religious adherents 
(and only for these people) is substantively neutral and thus in keeping 
with the objectives of the Free Exercise Clause.
231
  It is unlikely that the 
exemption would encourage non-adherents to convert to Judaism or Islam 
solely for the purpose of circumcising their sons in San Francisco.  Very 
few people would be so incentivized by the exemption that they would 
convert religions to take advantage of this minor accommodation.
232
  Thus, 
the exemption is substantively neutral because it is unlikely to change 
anyone’s incentives to pursue circumcision, but criminalizing the religious 
conduct would disincentivize the religious activity.  But, to the extent that 
the exemption would encourage people to join the Jewish or Islamic 
faiths—or to participate in these faiths’ practices to a greater degree, for 
those already members—that would be a basis for denying the exemption 
                                                                                                                          
228 Id. at 575–76.   
229 Id. at 576. 
230 If enacted, the proposal’s likely consequence would be that religious circumcisions would 
continue unabated, with families simply travelling outside of San Francisco to have the ritual 
performed on their sons.  Instances of non-religious circumcisions, which primarily occur in the 
hospital, however, would likely decrease as parents, sans religious motivation, are less likely to find 
alternative accommodations.  
231 An exemption for only religious adherents might offend the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”), but that issue is beyond the scope of this Note.   
232 This is especially true as applied to the San Francisco proposal.  Those not qualifying for the 
exemption could simply go to somewhere else to have the circumcision performed.  Conceivably, if a 
national ban was imposed, the argument that the exemption is substantively neutral is weaker.  
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as creating an establishment of religion.
233
 
There is a legitimate fear that some people would lie about (or 
exaggerate the extent of) their religious affiliation to exploit the exemption 
given to religious adherents.  This fear is compounded by the fact that the 
Court will not inquire into the veracity of a religious adherent’s claim. 234  
While a certain amount of dishonest behavior is inevitable, for many 
people, religion is a deeply personal and private matter, such that few are 
likely to feign religious belief to take advantage of this minor 
accommodation.
235
  Further, even if there were more than a few spurious 
religious exemption claims, would that be a sufficient reason for denying 
those true religious observers some accommodation?  Surely the existence 
of a right under the Free Exercise Clause does not depend on the potential 
for skullduggery by a determined few.  Just as Blackstone understood that 
it was better that ten guilty go free than one innocent be convicted,
236
 it is 
preferable that a few illegitimate exemptions be granted than deny those 
true followers the right to practice their religious obligations.  
As the reviews by Laycock
237
 and others
238
 make clear, prior to Smith, 
the Court embraced a substantive neutrality approach––both in its Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clause cases.  In Everson v. Board of 
Education,
239
 the Court explained “[n]either [a state nor the federal 
government] can force [or] influence a person to go or to remain away 
from church against his will.”240  In Sherbert, the Court taught that a 
religious exemption “reflects nothing more than the governmental 
obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences.”241  This 
reasoning is a clear embrace of substantive neutrality—recall that an 
exemption creates a religious category and thus violates the formal 
                                                                                                                          
233 See Lund, supra note 193, at 377  (analogizing from Smith about the effect exemptions have 
on non-observers).  Lund writes that “[t]o the extent that letting the Native American Church use 
peyote incentivizes other to join the Church, we have a reason to deny the exemption or extend it to 
deep rooted claims of secular conscience.”  Id.   
234 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (1990) (“It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of 
particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those 
creeds.” (quoting Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989))).  
235 This is especially true in the case of the San Francisco proposal, as the determined secularist 
could simply go one town over and have his son circumcised at any hospital or doctor’s office.  
236 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352 (“[T]he law holds, that it is better that ten 
guilty persons e[s]cape, than that one innocent [s]uffer.”).   
237 Laycock, Revisited, supra note 197, at 57–59 (reviewing and analyzing cases under the 
religion clauses of the First Amendment).   
238 See, e.g., Lund, supra note 193, at 354 (stating that prior to Smith, the Court embraced a 
substantive neutrality approach).   
239 330 U.S. 1 (1947).  
240 Laycock, Revisited, supra note 197, at 57 (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 15).  
241 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963); see Laycock, Revisited, supra note 197, at 57–
58 (quoting passages from Sherbert and Yoder to show the Court’s embrace of substantive neutrality).  
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neutrality rule;
242
 thus, when the Court speaks of neutrality it must think of 
it in the substantive sense.  Similarly, in Yoder, the Court held that “[a] 
regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the 
constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens 
the free exercise of religion.”243   
A “friendly” separation of church and state requires substantive 
neutrality.  In leaving religion as a matter of private choice, substantive 
neutrality provides the greatest amount of religious liberty possible under 
the Constitution.  Commenting on Smith, one author wrote that the Court 
“reduc[ed] the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, in large measure, to 
an equality right as opposed to a liberty right.”244  If this is so—if the Free 
Exercise Clause mandates simply equality in terms—then the Clause is 
rendered superfluous, since other provisions of the Constitution provide for 
equality, specifically the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
245
  Therefore, if religious liberty is to remain a fundamental 
value in our democracy, then the constitutional protection of the Free 
Exercise Clause should not end at the absence of hostility.  It must also 
include the freedom from incidental (perhaps inadvertent, but nonetheless 
oppressive) governmental restraints on religious conduct.  
Substantive neutrality is a means of preserving religious liberty, which 
is a concept beyond religious equality.  The idea embraces religious 
freedom by minimizing government influence over religion,
246
 thus leaving 
it as a matter of private and personal choice to the greatest extent practical.  
Formal neutrality is a necessary condition for religious liberty, but at times 
it can be insufficient.  To quote Laycock, “If the free exercise of religion 
includes anything beyond bare belief, it must be the right to perform the 
sacred rituals of the faith.”247   
Laycock’s formulation might be cabined to recognize that there are 
times when a compelling governmental interest justifies the infringement 
on religious liberty.  This Note does not argue that all religious conduct is 
beyond government regulation; regulations infringing on religious practice, 
however, must be justified under the strict scrutiny construct the Court uses 
when government regulation infringes on the exercise of fundamental 
                                                                                                                          
242 See Laycock, supra note 17, at 1000 (arguing that the religious exemption to Prohibition was 
unconstitutional under a formal neutrality rule). 
243 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (emphasis added); see Laycock, Revisited, 
supra note 197, at 58 (discussing Yoder and substantive neutrality).  
244 Daniel D. Conkle, Religious Truth, Pluralism, and Secularization: The Shaking Foundations of 
American Religious Liberty, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1755, 1755 (2011).  
245 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
246 Laycock, Revisited, supra note 197, at 65; see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 524 
(1986) (“A critical function of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is to protect the rights of 
members of minority religions against quiet erosion by majoritarian social institutions that dismiss 
minority beliefs as unimportant, because unfamiliar.”).   
247 Laycock, Formal, supra note 17, at 1000.  
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rights.  For example, fundamentalists in Mali recently cut off the hand of a 
man accused of larceny in accordance with their religious beliefs.
248
  
Obviously there is some conduct—stoning and human sacrifice, for 
example—that a modern society cannot allow regardless of religious 
beliefs.  The rule the Court used prior to Smith dealt with this problem 
through the compelling interest test; Smith does away with this 
accommodating standard. 
The position that religious observers are entitled to some relief from 
generally applicable laws having an incidental effect on their religious 
practice is not without detractors.  Typical is the argument advanced by 
legal scholar Abbie Chessler, who suggests that just because “circumcision 
is a tenet of certain religions is not a reason to provide an exemption from 
a generally applicable criminal law.”249  
Chessler is correct to conclude that under the Smith rule, prohibition of 
circumcision would be upheld, even against those who justify it on 
religious grounds;
250
 even so, her lack of concern for the liberty interests at 
stake is disconcerting.  Furthermore, her analysis of the underlying legal 
principles is spurious.  Quoting from Smith, Chessler writes that the Court 
has never held that religious belief is a valid excuse from any otherwise 
valid and generally applicable law.
251
  But, of course this is not true, as 
Yoder held that religious beliefs could relieve one from his obligation to 
follow a law pursuant to the to the compelling interest test.
252
  Moreover, 
Chessler recites this text from Minersville School District v. Gobitis
253
: 
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long 
struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from 
obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or 
restriction of religious belief.  The mere possession of 
religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns 
of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the 
discharge of political responsibilities.
254
   
                                                                                                                          
248 Adam Nossiter, Islamists in North Mali Amputate Man’s Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2012, at 
A4.  
249 Chessler, supra note 29, at 601.  
250 Id. at 599.  Povenmire also recites that a ban on circumcision would be upheld—even without 
a compelling government interest—provided it is neutral and generally applicable. Povenmire, supra 
note 50, at 117. 
251 Chessler, supra note 29, at 599 (quoting Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990)). 
252 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that the First Amendment prevented 
Wisconsin from enforcing that compulsory school attendance law against the Amish parents); see 
McConnell, supra note 218, at 1120 (citing Yoder for the proposition that religious beliefs have been 
used to excuse compliance from a generally applicable law).  
253 310 U.S. 586 (1940).   
254 Id. at 594–95.  
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It is curious why Chessler and Justice Scalia in Smith
255
 rely so heavily 
on this case, given that Gobitis was overturned three years later in West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
256
 with that Court stating 
that some rights are beyond the whims of the political process, included 
among them “freedom of worship.”257  As one scholar criticized, “Relying 
on Gobitis without mentioning Barnette is like relying on Plessy v. 
Ferguson without mentioning Brown v. Board of Education.”258 
In addition to being unnecessary after Smith, it has also been argued 
that religious exemptions are inappropriate because they amount to 
favoritism for religious people over nonreligious people.  This is the Equal 
Liberty theory.
259
  But exemptions can be reconciled with any supposed 
favoritism to religious conduct depending on where one sets the baseline 
for determining incentives.
260
  Taking the proposal in San Francisco as our 
example, if the baseline is the present state of the law: any child may be 
circumcised for religious and non-religious purposes, and a law is 
subsequently enacted prohibiting circumcisions, the religious liberty of 
those who practice circumcisions has decreased; their conduct has been 
disincentivized.  However, people who do not practice circumcision as a 
religious obligation have not lost any religious liberty relevant to the 
present discussion.  Thus, the Equal Liberty critique falls short because an 
exemption for religious observers restores their liberty interest to absolute 
zero, putting them at the same level as the non-religious person. 
Relatedly, there is an argument that a religious exemption would 
violate the Establishment Clause by advancing religious interests in some 
way.  To the extent that an exemption does violate the Establishment 
Clause by privileging religious adherents, the response given by 
substantive neutrality is simply that: 
Government does not establish a religion by leaving it alone; 
                                                                                                                          
255 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79 (citing Gobitis for the proposition that the Court has “never held 
that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law 
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate,” and referring to Gobitis as a case from the Court’s 
“free exercise jurisprudence”).  
256 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
257 Id. at 638 (stating that a purpose of the Bill of Rights was to place certain rights, including 
freedom of speech and freedom to worship beyond the reach of momentary political majorities); see 
McConnell, supra note 218, at 1124 (stating that the Court fails to mention that Gobitis was overturned 
by Barnette). 
258 McConnell, supra note 218, at 1124 (footnotes omitted).  
259 Lund, supra note 193, at 356 (“Equal Liberty’s core claim [is] in the absence of things like 
hostility, neglect, or indifference, religious exemptions are constitutionally inappropriate because they 
essentially amount to favoritism for religious groups and individuals.”); see also Laycock, Revisited, 
supra note 197, at 80–81 (discussing Stephen Gey’s theory that any accommodation for religious 
conduct violates the Establishment Clause).  
260 See Laycock, Formal, supra note 17, at 1005 (“[S]ubstantive neutrality requires a baseline 
from which to measure encouragement and discouragement.”).  
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government does not benefit religion by first imposing a 
burden through regulation and then lifting that burden 
through exemption, and, in most cases, such exemptions do 
not encourage anyone to engage in a religious practice unless 
he was already independently motivated to engage in the 
practice.
261
 
An exemption does not favor a religion by simply lifting an underlying 
regulation that is burdensome to the religious faithful.  Professor Laycock 
notes that the Court has rejected on numerous occasions the argument that 
exemptions violate the Establishment Clause.
262
    
As applied to the subject of this Note—the proposed circumcision ban 
in San Francisco—the argument is that there is no establishment of religion 
where an exemption is carved out to restore religious adherents to the 
position they enjoyed before government stepped in and burdened their 
religious conduct in the first place.  Thus, an exemption for Jews and 
Muslims to the San Francisco proposal would not privilege them; it would 
merely restore them to the status quo ante.  Exemptions do not create an 
establishment of religion because no exemption would be needed had the 
government not intervened in the first place by burdening the religion 
through its regulatory powers. 
If the Free Exercise Clause means anything, surely it means that 
government cannot impose a Hobson’s choice on religious adherents: 
abandon your centuries-old religious tradition or continue to practice that 
tradition but subject yourself to criminal sanctions.  Smith’s formal 
neutrality requirement and Lukumi’s object neutrality requirement are 
insufficient protectors of religious liberty.  Something more is needed to 
ensure that government does not have the unintended consequence of 
limiting religious practice.  That “something” is substantive neutrality.  
Evaluating laws by the incentives they create—rather than only by the 
categories they establish or the goal of the legislation—offers the greatest 
level of religious freedom possible.  
It is illuminating to consider how the results of several cases 
previously discussed in this Note might differ under a substantive 
neutrality regime.  Since the Court applied something akin to substantive 
neutrality in Sherbert and Yoder (without actually calling it that), the 
                                                                                                                          
261 Douglas Laycock, The Religious Exemptions Debate, 11 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 139, 153–
54 (2009). 
262 Id. at 154 n.53 (citing a list of cases where the Supreme Court rejected the argument); see also 
Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original Understanding of the 
Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1798 (2006) (“There is no significant originalist 
support for the core idea that exempting religion from regulation establishes religion . . . . I have found 
no one in the eighteenth century who attacked them as an establishment of religion or denied that 
legislatures had power to enact them.”).    
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results in those two cases would not change under the rule advocated for in 
this Note.  
If the Court continued along the Sherbert/Yoder line in Smith, the 
result might have differed.  The State of Oregon imposed a (facially) 
neutral and generally applicable law banning the possession of peyote.  
Two Native Americans who ingested peyote as part of a religious 
ceremony
263
 challenged that law as applied to them.
264
   
Under a substantive neutrality regime, the law would have been upheld 
in the aggregate, but an exemption might have been carved out for people 
(such as the appellants) who possessed peyote for religious reasons.  Of 
course, if the religious practice was so demonstrably dangerous, then there 
was a compelling state-interest for proscribing the conduct and it could still 
be regulated under the substantive neutrality rule.  This is the argument 
made by Justice O’Connor in her concurrence in Smith, where she wrote:  
I would conclude that uniform application of Oregon’s 
criminal prohibition is “essential to accomplish” its 
overriding interest in preventing the physical harm caused by 
the use of a Schedule I controlled substance . . . . Because the 
health effects caused by the use of controlled substances exist 
regardless of the motivation of the user, the use of such 
substances, even for religious purposes, violates the very 
purpose of the laws that prohibit them.  Moreover, in view of 
the societal interest in preventing trafficking in controlled 
substances, uniform application of the criminal prohibition at 
issue is essential to the effectiveness of Oregon’s stated 
interest in preventing any possession of peyote.
265
  
Thus, by applying substantive neutrality, Justice O’Connor gets the 
same result as the Court does, but under a different form of analysis: she 
recognized that the law imposed a burden on the religious adherents but 
concluded that the state’s interest in regulating was nonetheless sufficiently 
compelling to impose such a burden.  Her analysis is predicated on the 
important role that states play in policing illegal drug use.  It is conceivable 
that if the conduct at issue were something other than illegal drug use 
(male circumcision perhaps), Justice O’Connor’s rule would have led her 
to a different result than that reached by the Court. 
By tweaking the facts in Lukumi slightly, we can also consider how the 
                                                                                                                          
263 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
264 See supra note 156 and accompanying text (“Justice Scalia, rejected Smith’s argument . . .  
that the Free Exercise Clause required a religious-conduct exemption [for himself] from an otherwise 
valid law.”).  
265 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 905 (1990) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (citations omitted).  
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result would have differed under a substantive neutrality rule.  Recall that 
in Lukumi, the Court struck down the four ordinances at issue because they 
were neither neutral nor generally applicable.  If the ordinances had been 
written without the problems identified by the Court—namely if the city 
council did not have as its objective banishing Santeria from Hialeah—and 
if the ordinances were not written to apply only to religious sacrifice, the 
result would potentially have been different.  In our hypothetical, under 
Justice Scalia’s formal neutrality rule from Smith, the claimants in Lukumi 
would have lost because a truly neutral and generally applicable statute 
forbidding the slaughter of animals within the city would not violate the 
Free Exercise Clause. 
However, analyzing the same hypothetical statute under substantive 
neutrality, the analysis is more nuanced and the outcome less certain.
266
  
Since our hypothetical lacks the exemptions and narrow definitions of the 
Lukumi ordinances, it is a law of general application.  However, the 
hypothetical statute would not be substantively neutral because it creates a 
disincentive for engaging in religious conduct, to wit, the ritual sacrifice of 
animals in accordance with Santeria.  (The disincentive is whatever the 
punishment is for violating the hypothetical rule, presumably a fine and/ or 
imprisonment.)   
The second step is to consider whether there is a compelling state 
interest in applying the ban to the Santeria religious adherents.  Whether or 
not such an interest exists would turn on what the state claims are its 
interests in promulgating the regulation.  The Court in Lukumi found no 
compelling interest existed because the state’s purported interest—the safe 
and sanitary disposal of animals—could be achieved in a more narrowly 
tailored way without targeting the Santeria faith.
267
  Moreover, even if the 
state did have a valid purpose in legislating in this field, it was undermined 
by the under-inclusiveness of the law, which was written to only apply to 
Santeria adherents.
268
  Under the hypothetical law described above, these 
flaws are not present, so the Court could find that the state does have a 
compelling interest in applying its regulation to the Santeria adherents.  
Still, it seems that the City of Hialeah would be able to regulate animal 
slaughter in a more narrowly tailored way.  For example, it could impose 
regulations and penalties for the unclean disposal of animal carcasses 
without actually banning ritual sacrifice.  Thus, perhaps the hypothetical 
law is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive under a strict scrutiny 
analysis.   
                                                                                                                          
266 Justice Souter’s concurrence in Lukumi, where he advocates for the substantive neutrality rule, 
see supra notes 224–229 and accompanying text, does not explain how he would have applied that rule 
to the facts of that case.  
267 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1998). 
268 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.  
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B.  Compelling Interest Test 
Once we accept substantive neutrality as the proper way to 
conceptualize the neutrality requirement, we could only conclude that the 
San Francisco proposal is not substantively neutral because it creates a 
disincentive against engaging in religious conduct: criminal prosecution 
and financial sanction.  Thus, the ballot measure can only be saved if it can 
be justified by a compelling state interest.
269
  The compelling interest test 
places a high bar on state interference with religious conduct; in Lukumi, 
the Court referred to it as “the most rigorous of scrutiny.”270  
Cases where the Court has used the compelling interest test to strike 
down laws that threatened religious liberty are instructive.
271
  In Sherbert, 
the Court held that protecting the state’s unemployment fund from spurious 
religious claims was not a sufficiently compelling reason to deny the 
claimant unemployment compensation.
272
  Similarly, in Yoder, the Court 
found that the state’s interest in ensuring that all students were educated 
was not sufficiently compelling to impose upon the Amish religious 
practice a requirement that Amish children attend school through age 
sixteen.
273
  Finally, in Lukumi, the Court found that because the ordinances 
were under-inclusive by not regulating analogous secular conduct, they 
could not survive review under the compelling interest test.
274
  Under a 
substantive neutrality rule (which is what the Court essentially applied in 
Sherbert and Yoder), these laws would fail because they force religious 
adherents to make the unconscionable choice between following their 
religious tradition or facing state sanction—without there being compelling 
state interest necessitating that choice be made.
275
  Substantive neutrality, 
unlike formal or object neutrality, would require such an interest when the 
state attempts to place a roadblock in front of religious practice.  
                                                                                                                          
269 See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531–32 (stating that a law that is not neutral and not generally 
applicable “must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to 
advance that interest”).  
270 Id. at 546. 
271 One additional case where the Court used the compelling interest test to uphold a substantively 
unneutral law requires mention.  In Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986), the Court 
denied an Orthodox Jewish man who wished to wear a yarmulke with his military uniform an 
exemption from the Army’s dress code.  Even if the result in Goldman does not seem right (for 
example, was the military’s interest in conformity sufficiently compelling?), the analysis the Court 
applied continued to show deference to the religious practice through its embrace of substantive 
neutrality.   
272 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).  
273 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972).  
274 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546.   
275 Even under the substantive neutrality advocated for by this Note, laws burdening religious 
practice will not be upheld where there is a compelling state interest in outlawing the practice.  For 
example, a law outlawing the hypothetical religious practice of stoning “disobedient women” would be 
upheld (even though it is not substantively neutral) because the state has a compelling interest in 
policing domestic violence and protecting women.  
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Supporters of a ban on male circumcision argue that there is a 
compelling interest to justify such an infringement on religious liberty, 
although they do not explain why the ban (even if rational) is compelling.  
As one writer observed: “It is no longer necessary to demonstrate a 
compelling governmental interest in order to uphold the constitutionality of 
such laws, although such an interest is present in the case of 
circumcision.”276  Similarly, Chessler simply writes, “[t]he government . . . 
maintains a compelling interest in protecting children from harmful 
religious practices,”277 without demonstrating why the government’s 
interest in legislating is sufficiently compelling.  
Contrary to what the critics charge, there is no compelling interest that 
justifies upholding the San Francisco proposal.  The medical evidence that 
circumcision is harmful or dangerous to men is inconclusive at best, 
although the weight of the evidence suggests that circumcision has many 
positive medical benefits.
278
  However, the key point to infer from the lack 
of consensus (to the extent such a lack of consensus in fact exists within 
the medical community) is that it cannot possibly be as dangerous to 
children as the Inactivist community suggests.  Surely if the procedure led 
to the “parade of horribles” the Inactivists claim, the procedure would have 
been abandoned long ago.  Thus, given that the procedure has not been 
shown to be demonstrably harmful to children, the state’s interest in 
imposing the circumcision ban is not sufficiently compelling.  Therefore, 
the proposal would fail when subjected to a rigorous strict scrutiny 
analysis. 
But, assuming for the sake of argument that the medical evidence 
conclusively proved circumcision’s harmful health consequences, the 
proposal would then still need to be balanced against the deprivation of 
religious liberty to survive the constitutional challenge.  The Court’s 
reasoning in Yoder is instructive on this point: Even if there are some 
health consequences to circumcision (just as there are invariably some 
negative consequences to ending a child’s education at age sixteen), are 
they so compelling as to justify the state denying religious adherents the 
right to continue a centuries-old religious tradition?
279
  The lack of 
                                                                                                                          
276 Povenmire, supra note 50, 117–18 (footnote omitted).  
277 Chessler, supra note 29, at 598. 
278 See supra Part II.C. (discussing the medical debate over circumcision).  
279 In his dissenting opinion in Yoder, Justice Douglas considered the problem that a parent’s 
decision not to send his children to school was a decision having permanent, irrevocable consequences.  
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“It is the future of the 
student, not the future of the parents, that is imperiled by today’s decision.  If a parent keeps his child 
out of school beyond the grade school, then the child will be forever barred from entry into the new and 
amazing world of diversity that we have today . . . . If he is harnessed to the Amish way of life by those 
in authority over him and if his education is truncated, his entire life may be stunted and deformed.”).  
The decision of parents to circumcise their children, similarly, is a choice that is permanent and cannot 
be undone.  To some, this is a rationale for upholding the San Francisco circumcision ban (assuming it 
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consensus among medical experts concerning circumcision—and the 
plausible medical benefits gained from the procedure—demonstrate that 
this is simply not the case.  
In addition to making medical arguments to justify the ban, Inactivists 
commonly compare male circumcision to female circumcision,
280
 arguing 
that it does not make sense to ban one but not the other.  Under the 
compelling state interest test, however, this comparison falls apart.  
Chessler, for example, writes, “Claims that [male and female circumcision] 
cannot be linked perpetuates the continued legitimacy of one human rights 
abuse, male circumcision, through the condemnation of another.  An 
analogy must be made between the two; regardless of whether a child is 
male or female, neither should be subject to genital mutilation.”281  
At least one religion (Islam) holds female circumcision out as a 
religious obligation;
282
 a hypothetical law banning it would be generally 
applicable, but not substantively neutral.  But, while male circumcision has 
some plausible medical consequences (and many more medical benefits), 
female circumcision is much more serious and devastating to the 
woman.
283
  Female circumcision often involves the removal of the entire 
clitoris,
284
 whereas male circumcision involves the removal of just the 
foreskin surrounding the head of the penis.   The equivalent male version 
of female circumcision would be the removal of the entire head of the 
penis.  Also, the purposes of the two procedures differ. Whereas 
circumcised males are still able to enjoy sexual activity, the removal of a 
woman’s clitoris has the object of denying her sexual pleasure.  For these 
reasons, a ban on male circumcision could not be justified under the 
compelling interest test, whereas an identical ban on female circumcision 
                                                                                                                          
was approved).  Under the proposal, those men who choose to be circumcised may do so of their own 
volition at age eighteen, the age of majority in the United States.  However, this rationale would not be 
a sufficiently compelling basis for trampling on the religious practice of circumcision.  As noted above, 
in the Jewish faith, circumcision must occur on the eighth day of life, save a few minor exceptions.  
Thus, leaving the choice to men at age eighteen would gravely trample upon the religious practice (just 
as compulsory school attendance laws trampled upon Amish religious practice).  More globally, parents 
make thousands, if not more, irrevocable decisions on behalf of their children.  Thus, singling out this 
decision for disparate treatment would not only fail the substantive neutrality principle, but quite 
possibly would violate the less accommodating formal neutrality rule.   
280 See, e.g., Email from Matthew Hess, President, MGMBILL.ORG to Author, supra note 64 
(comparing female circumcision to male circumcision). 
281 Chessler, supra note 29, at 612.  
282 Islam appears to be the only religion to embrace that custom as part of its religious tradition.  
See Chessler, supra note 29, at 581–83 (discussing female circumcision in the Islamic tradition); 
Povenmire, supra note 50, 114–15 (“Many Muslims believe that the tenets of their faith require 
surgery, although this is contested by some Islamic scholars.” (footnote omitted)). 
283 Some of the complications that may result from female circumcision include bleeding, 
infection, pain, urinary tract infections, scarring, cysts and sexual and physiological side effects.  
Chessler, supra note 29, at 562–63. 
284 Id. at 561; Povenmire, supra note 50, at 115.   
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is easily justifiable.  
C.  Hybrid Claim  
The decision in Smith suggested that the only cases where a claim 
under the Free Exercise Clause had been vindicated were “hybrid 
situation[s]” involving not just a free exercise claim but also a claim 
connected to a constitutionally protected communicative activity or 
parental right.
285
  Thus, the Smith Court characterized Yoder not as a free 
exercise case
286
 but as a case concerning a parent’s right to direct the 
religious upbringing of his or her children.
287
  The Court held in Smith that 
no such hybrid claim was raised because the activity in question, peyote 
use for religious conduct, did not implicate either communicative or 
parental rights.
288
 
Circumcising children as a matter of religious tradition involves both 
communicative and parental rights.   
1. Communicative Activity 
As an example of a communicative right connected to a free exercise 
case, the Smith Court cited
289
 the statute invalidated in Cantwell v. 
Connecticut.
290
  In Cantwell, the Court struck down a licensing system for 
religious and charitable organizations under which an administrator had 
discretion to deny a license to any cause deemed non-religious.
291
   
Likewise, for those who perform circumcision as a matter of religious 
obligation, there is significant communicative value associated with their 
conduct.  In Judaism and Islam, circumcision is a way of identifying 
                                                                                                                          
285 Emp’t Div., Dept’ of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990). 
286 Id. at 881 n.1 (stating that both cases dealing with communicative or parental rights have 
“adverted to the non-free-exercise principle involved”).  
287 Id.  For this proposition, the Court cited to Yoder’s reliance on Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
US. 510 (1925), which held that parents had the right to direct the education of their children by 
choosing between public and private schools.  Justice Souter disputed the Court’s reliance on Pierce in 
Smith to classify Yoder as a hybrid rights case.  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 566–67 n.4 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (noting that the Yoder Court’s characterization of Pierce as “inapplicable” and stating that 
the State’s actions must be justified under the Free Exercise Clause).  McConnell also criticizes this 
false distinction, noting that Yoder held that parents may not violate the compulsory attendance law for 
non-religious reasons.  “Thus, according to Yoder parents have no right independent of the Free 
Exercise Clause to withhold their children from school, and according to Smith they have no such right 
under the Free Exercise Clause.”  McConnell, supra note 218, at 1121.  
288 Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.  Justice Souter’s concurrence in Lukumi argued that the hybrid 
distinction, while unnecessary, would cover the situation in Smith, since taking peyote under the facts 
of that case involved communicative and associational rights.  Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 567 (Souter, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
289 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
290 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
291 Id. at 304–07.  
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oneself as a member of the religion.
292
  A government ban on circumcision 
would be equivalent to banning jewelry without an exception for crosses, 
or banning head coverings without an exception for the Muslim headscarf.  
All of these activities involve religious acts that have significant 
communicative and associational value, raising both free speech and free 
exercise claims.  
2. Parental Rights
293
 
The second type of hybrid claim that the Court acknowledged in Smith 
was a claim implicating the parental right to raise one’s children without 
state inference, as the Court recognized in Yoder.
294
   
According to Smith:  
Yoder said that “the Court’s holding in Pierce stands as a 
charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious 
upbringing of their children.  And, when the interests of 
parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim of the 
nature revealed by the record, more than merely a 
‘reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency 
of the State’ is required to sustain the validity of the State’s 
requirement under the First Amendment.”295 
Applying the holding in Yoder to the San Francisco proposal, the latter 
implicates a parent’s right to direct his or her child’s upbringing296 by 
denying the right to welcome his sons into the chosen faith through a 
centuries-old tradition.  And, specifically with regard to medical decisions 
(the decision to circumcise a child or not is a medical one), the Court has 
recognized a parent’s right to make decisions about his or her children’s 
                                                                                                                          
292 See, e.g., Aryeh Citron, The Mitzvah Circumcision (Part I), CHABAD.ORG, 
http://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/1014930/jewish/The-Mitzvah-of-Circumcision-Part-
I.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2012) (referring to circumcision as “a sign, affixed in our flesh, that we are 
believers in the one G[o]d”); see also supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text (discussing male 
circumcision as a form of expressive conduct in the Jewish religion).  
293 This Note focuses on religious exemptions to the San Francisco proposal.  There is also an 
argument, only partially developed here, that parents have a right regardless of religious prerogative to 
make decisions for their children.  For a discussion of that argument, see Eugene Volokh, Proposed 
San Francisco Circumcision Ban (with No Discussion of Religious Freedom in this Post), supra note 
51.  
294 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (recognizing the rights of parents, acknowledged in Pierce, to 
direct the education of their children).  
295 Id. at 881 n.1 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972)).  
296 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (holding that a state law 
requiring that parents enroll their children in public school through age sixteen “unreasonably interferes 
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their 
control”).  
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medical care.
297
  Thus, given the plausible medical reasons for 
circumcision (reduced urinary infection, and reduced risk of penile cancer 
and HIV/AIDS
298
), and absent some compelling medical evidence of the 
procedure’s harmful effects (presently none exists), the normal 
presumption of parental deference applies, and parents have the right to 
make this medical decision for their children.    
Inactivists argue, relying on Prince,
299
 that even if parents have the 
right to direct their children’s religious and medical upbringing, they do 
not have the right “to make martyrs of their children.”300  While it is true 
that the parental right to direct a child’s upbringing is not limitless,301 the 
test the Court has developed accounts for this limitation.  Under the 
compelling interest test, a parent’s right to raise his or her child is balanced 
against the potential harm to the child by following the parent’s religious 
choice. 
In our case, there is a world of difference between denying a child 
lifesaving medical treatment and allowing him to be circumcised as a 
member of a religious faith.  As noted several times before, the harm of 
circumcision has not been conclusively established, and there are many 
plausible medical benefits derived from the procedure.  Even as there 
exists some debate within the medical community about the efficacy of 
circumcision, the charge that boys are “martyred” by circumcision is 
nothing more than hyperbole of the worst sort.  As the discussion above 
shows, instances of death as a result of circumcision are practically non-
existent.
302
  Therefore, the ordinary presumption of parental deference 
applies, and the parental right to raise one’s child enjoined with the free 
exercise right to practice one’s religion is applicable in requiring an 
exemption for religious followers to a circumcision ban.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This Note has considered one aspect of the tension between liberal 
democracy and religious freedom.  For laws to have any significance, 
citizens must not disregard them at will.  And yet, the essence of religious 
liberty requires that believers enjoy some modicum of accommodation 
when their faith’s practices conflict with generally applicable laws.  This 
                                                                                                                          
297 See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979) (holding that parents have a role in their 
children’s medical decisions with the presumption that parents will act in their children’s best interest).  
298 See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.  
299 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (“The right to practice religion freely 
does not include liberty to expose the community or the child . . . to ill health or death.”).  
300 Id. at 170.  
301 See Parham, 442 U.S. at 604 (“We also conclude, however, that the child's rights and the 
nature of the commitment decision are such that parents cannot always have absolute and unreviewable 
discretion to decide whether to have a child institutionalized.”). 
302 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.  
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Note has considered this tension in the context of the proposal in San 
Francisco to ban male circumcision, and has argued for the adoption of one 
theory that partially resolves this tension.   
This Note argued that the San Francisco proposal does not comport 
with the values of religious liberty, as defined by the Court’s 
jurisprudence, and therefore it should not be upheld pursuant to the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.  While the proposal is generally 
applicable, it is not neutral because it dis-incentivizes religious followers 
from engaging in certain conduct, here, infant male circumcision.   
Admittedly the Court’s definition of neutrality is in flux.  Thus, more 
significant perhaps than whether the proposal is neutral is how the Court 
conceptualizes the neutrality requirement.  This Note argued that the Court 
should adopt substantive neutrality as the fullest embodiment of religious 
liberty.  However, under the Court’s present understanding of the neutrality 
requirement—formal and object neutrality—the ballot measure would be 
found to be neutral and therefore upheld.  But a nation as committed to 
religious liberty as ours should not accept the mere absence of hostility as 
the ceiling for our religious liberties; that is just the floor.  
If substantive neutrality is how neutrality is understood, this proposal 
could not stand (at least to the extent that it would apply to Jews and 
Muslims in the exercise of their religious practices).  Rightly, the Court 
applies strict scrutiny when a state deprives its citizens of the fundamental 
right to engage in religious conduct.  No compelling state interest has been 
shown, nor could be shown, that would justify this proposal.  Moreover, 
religious observers seeking an exemption have a solid hybrid claim, as the 
proposal implicates both communicative and parental rights.   
Adopting a substantive neutrality rule is consistent with religious 
liberty and does not violate the Establishment Clause.  Substantive 
neutrality—that is, requiring the government to provide neutral incentives 
and disincentives for religious conduct—offers the greatest amount of 
protection for religious adherents that our Constitution could provide.  
Liberty does not just mean the right to believe in something; it also 
includes the concomitant right to act upon that belief.  A rule that holds 
formal neutrality sufficient to meet the constitutional threshold is itself 
insufficient because it fails to account for those occasions where 
governmental action has an incidental deleterious effect on religious 
conduct. 
This Note began by presenting the concept of a “friendly” separation 
of church and state.  Perhaps such a separation requires mere formal or 
object neutrality: If the government is not hostile to religion, then it is 
acting neutrally and its regulations would be constitutional.  But our 
Constitution and the cause of religious liberty demand more.  Put simply, 
the government should not be in the business of picking winners and losers 
in the religious marketplace. 
